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Preface
The Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) 
aims to generate a stronger evidence base on state-
building, service delivery and livelihood recovery in 
fragile and conflict-affected situations. It began in 2011 
with funding from the UK’s Department for International 
Development, Irish Aid and the European Commission.
At the centre of SLRC’s research are three core 
questions, developed over the course of an intensive 
one-year inception period in which the consortium set 
about identifying major evidence gaps:
 ■ To what extent and under what conditions does 
the delivery of basic services and social protection 
contribute towards state legitimacy in fragile and 
conflict-affected situations?
 ■ How do external actors attempt to develop the 
capacities of states in fragile and conflict-affected 
situations to deliver better services – and how fit for 
purpose are the dominant approaches?
 ■ What do livelihood trajectories in fragile and conflict-
affected situations tell us about how governments 
and aid agencies can more effectively support the 
ways in which people make a living? 
From 2011 to 2016 – the duration of SLRC’s first phase 
– the consortium implemented packages of quantitative 
and qualitative research across eight countries affected 
by fragility and conflict to varying degrees: Afghanistan, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sri Lanka and Uganda.
This paper is one of a series of ‘synthesis reports’ 
produced at the end of SLRC’s first phase. These reports 
bring together and analyse all relevant material on 
SLRC’s overarching research questions, with a view to 
drawing out broader lessons that will be of use to policy 
makers, practitioners and researchers. There are five in 
total:
 ■ Service delivery, public perceptions and state 
legitimacy. A synthesis of SLRC’s material on the first 
overarching research question above.
 ■ Service delivery and state capacity. A synthesis of 
SLRC’s material on its second overarching research 
question.
 ■ Livelihoods, conflict and recovery. A synthesis of 
SLRC’s material on its third overarching research 
question.
 ■ Markets, conflict and recovery. A more focused 
synthesis of the role that markets and the private 
sector play in processes of livelihood recovery. It links 
to and informs the ‘Livelihoods, conflict and recovery’ 
report.
 ■ Tracking livelihoods, service delivery and governance. 
A synthesis of SLRC’ cross-country survey findings, 
drawing on two rounds of data collection with the 
same respondents. 
 
Although specific authors were responsible for the 
analysis and writing of each synthesis report, all must 
ultimately be considered products of a collective, 
consortium-wide effort. They simply would not have 
been possible without the efforts and outputs of 
SLRC’s various partner organisations. They include the 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in the UK, the 
Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) in Sri Lanka, Feinstein 
International Center (FIC) at Tufts University in the USA, 
the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 
the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in 
Pakistan, Disaster Studies at Wageningen University 
(WUR) in the Netherlands, the Nepal Centre for 
Contemporary Research (NCCR), Focus 1000 in Sierra 
Leone, and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
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vEvery year a quarter of all international aid – 
approximately US$15 billion – is spent on capacity 
development. Its designated purpose is to strengthen 
recipients’ ability to manage their own affairs 
successfully, and to render unnecessary any outside 
assistance from aid agencies. 
Part of what drives this substantial investment is the 
state-building agenda, which has emerged and evolved 
in recent years to become the overarching framework for 
international engagement in places affected by fragility 
and conflict. In these contexts, external assistance 
is not just about improving ‘basic’ development 
outcomes. It is also expected to strengthen state (often 
government) structures, where weaknesses are typically 
framed as both a cause and a consequence of political 
violence and underdevelopment. 
By defining state fragility as a problem or lack of 
capacity, capacity development thus becomes the 
primary solution. But despite this idea’s continued 
dominance, results in practice are frequently 
disappointing. Why is this so often the case? 
What	we	did
Over a period of six years, the Secure Livelihoods 
Research Consortium (SLRC) has conducted a series of 
studies on state capacity in eight countries,1 focussing 
on the ways in which international actors attempt 
to build the capacity of states in fragile and conflict-
affected situations to deliver services – typically 
considered a ‘core function’ of any modern state. The 
studies are diverse in nature, ranging from community-
level governance in Afghanistan to health-sector 
strengthening in Sierra Leone.
This report synthesises the findings of these 
studies, drawing out cross-cutting themes that help 
us understand both the ways in which capacity 
1 Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nepal, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, South Sudan and Uganda.
development in such contexts is currently undertaken, 
and the assumptions, challenges and trade-offs that 
underpin this practice.
What	we	found
From this analysis, we begin to see the narrow and 
largely apolitical ways in which capacity development is 
operationalised. Four	key	synthesis	findings emerge:
1 Training is the default tool of capacity development
2 Power and politics are central to how services 
are delivered, but capacity development often 
concentrates on technical aspects
3 Capacity development currently focuses on (parts of) 
the state, largely overlooking ‘alternative’ capacities 
and how people use services in practice 
4 Getting beyond the system’s ‘units’ to engage with 
‘systemic capacity’ remains an ongoing challenge.
These findings may not seem surprising to those familiar 
with capacity development and state-building. Indeed, 
part of what is remarkable about the continuation of 
capacity development for several decades – as well as 
the vast sums of aid money it attracts – is that so much 
is already known about its limitations. To understand 
why these limitations persist, we must examine the 
nature of the system that sustains this quandary: 
namely, the aid industry itself. 
Unpacking the political economy of the aid industry 
reveals a range of factors that limit capacity 
development’s effectiveness. This includes the fact that 
while good ideas exist about how to improve capacity 
development, they often do not filter into practice. Staff 
are often hired for their technical skills rather than their 
contextual or conceptual knowledge, which reinforces the 
Executive summary
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tendency to treat capacity development as the transfer of 
technical skills. Further obstacles are presented due to 
programmes’ short timeframes and the focus on tangible 
and quantifiable results with minimal risk. Too often, 
capacity development ends up projectising what are 
essentially processes of social change. 
What it all means for policy
So, what does this mean for the future of capacity 
development, particularly within the state-building 
agenda? SLRC’s research, and indeed the wider 
literature, suggest that fundamental changes are 
needed. At the same time, however, constraints 
imposed by the political economy of the aid industry 
challenge the possibility of alternative approaches. 
While this scenario might not provide much in the 
way of hope and optimism, we put forward five	
recommendations for ways forward. Specifically, the aid 
industry should:
1 be prepared to change ways of thinking and working 
in order to ‘do’ capacity development better
2 accept that capacity development is about politics, 
and think and work politically to negotiate this
3 start from an understanding of how people use 
services in practice, recognising existing capacities 
and limitations
4 think about capacity as not just tangible building 
blocks, but as the glue that holds services together
5 build the capacity of the aid industry to develop 
capacity.
These recommendations centre around the deeper 
need for a re-politicisation of capacity development, to 
acknowledge that it is ultimately about fostering social 
and political change. This has always been the case, 
and the focus of capacity development shifts with wider 
political winds. Yet because it remains cloaked in value-
neutral technocracy, the fundamentally political nature 
of capacity development is obscured. To overcome long-
standing limitations, this report suggests that politics 
must be brought to the fore.
1The failure to deliver basic or core state functions – public 
services, economic opportunities, security and social 
order – is often considered a marker of state fragility. 
Conflict is seen to undermine a state’s capacity to deliver 
these ‘goods’, in effect weakening or even stripping 
away pre-existing administrative competence. From 
this perspective, one of the central challenges facing 
state-building practitioners and policy-makers is how to 
redevelop or, in some cases establish, a state’s capacity 
to deliver its core functions. 
State-building is thus often operationalised as a huge 
exercise in capacity development. According to some, this 
is precisely how it has been approached in practice for a 
number of years (Hamieri, 2007; Petersen and Engberg-
Pedersen, 2013; Teskey et al., 2011). In the words of 
Petersen and Engberg-Pedersen (2013: 20), for example, 
capacity development is ‘perceived as the main road to 
peacebuilding and statebuilding’. As such, the evolution 
and expansion of the international state-building agenda 
can be seen as reinforcing capacity development as a 
pillar of the aid system. 
Despite dating back to at least the 1950s (see section 3 
for a short history of the concept), capacity development 
remains at the forefront of development policy, 
constituting one quarter (US$15 billion) of global aid 
expenditure each year (Guy, 2016). But the fact that 
the concept and practice of capacity development has 
existed for nearly 70 years is not the remarkable thing. 
Neither is the vast international investment that it attracts 
year after year. Rather, what is remarkable is that such 
significant efforts towards capacity development continue 
to be made, despite our knowledge of the limitations of 
dominant approaches. 
What accounts for this state of affairs? Why, as some 
have put it, does capacity development ‘so consistently 
fall short of [its] emancipatory promise’ (Clarke and 
Oswald, 2010: 1), particularly when it is often defined in 
hugely ambitious and transformative terms?2 Is it that 
the aid industry is still unclear about how to ‘do’ it well, 
particularly in difficult environments characterised by 
conflict and fragility? And why have we not learned from 
past mistakes?
2 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 
2006), for example, defines capacity as the ‘ability of people, organisations 
and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully’. Capacity 
development, therefore, refers to ‘the process whereby people, organisations 
and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain 
capacity over time’.
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In synthesising a series of empirical studies by the Secure 
Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), this report aims 
to shed light on these questions. The SLRC is a six-year 
(2011-16) cross-country programme, primarily concerned 
with better understanding processes of state-building 
and recovery in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC), Nepal, northern Uganda, Pakistan, 
Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Sri Lanka. One of the 
SLRC’s overarching research questions asks whether 
international attempts to build state capacity to deliver 
services, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected 
situations, are achieving positive outcomes (see section 2 
for a short overview of the relevant studies). As part of this 
research, the programme has sought to examine the ways 
in which external actors engage with states and practice 
capacity support. The ultimate question is: to what extent 
might we consider the current and dominant models ‘fit 
for purpose’? 
In this synthesis report, we argue that capacity 
development needs to be ‘re-politicised’ to reveal its 
biases and limitations in the places that it is deployed. 
This is not to say that no progress has been made from 
capacity development efforts. In some cases, there have 
been clear improvements in individuals’ or organisations’ 
ability to deliver public financial management, healthcare 
and other services. But there is cause for reflection on 
the persistent limitations and overlooked implications of 
dominant approaches to capacity development. 
In particular, we show that the way in which capacity 
development is practised tends to overlook the underlying 
power, politics and systems that prevent the delivery 
of quality services. Very often, grand efforts to rebuild 
states and societies boil down to training or providing 
equipment and resources. Admittedly, these are much 
easier to engage with than less tangible, measurable 
aspects of capacity such as power and politics. But, for all 
the ambition with which capacity development is talked 
about, particularly through the lens of state-building, we 
find a far less elaborate set of practices when we look 
at its implementation. This is the subject of section 4, 
where we draw on the SLRC material to establish four key 
‘synthesis findings’:
1 Training is the default tool of capacity development
2 Power and politics are central to how services 
are delivered, but capacity development often 
concentrates on technical aspects
3 Capacity development currently focuses on (parts of) 
the state, largely overlooking ‘alternative’ capacities 
and how people use services in practice 
4 Getting beyond the system’s ‘units’ to engage with 
‘systemic capacity’ remains an ongoing challenge.
In section 5, we examine some of the root causes of this 
status quo – and the disinclination to deal with the ‘stuff’ 
that really seems to matter. We focus on the aid industry’s 
political economy, with a number of what we might 
term ‘aid heuristics’ emerging that prevent learning and 
suppress alternative approaches.
Having covered both the lessons learned from the 
empirical material as well as the political economy 
constraints to better practice, we conclude in section 6 
with five recommendations for the aid industry. Our aim is 
to put forward ideas for the future of capacity development, 
so that, given the right circumstances, it can become 
operationally fit for purpose. Indeed, if we are to have 
any hope of changing the way that we practise capacity 
development, the first and most important step is to 
change the way that we think about it.
3SLRC has sought to understand what building capacity to 
deliver basic services in conflict-affected areas actually 
entails. As part of this, the Consortium has examined the 
ways in which international actors engage with states 
in order to build or develop the capacity to deliver these 
services.3
The SLRC programmes that have addressed the 
question of state capacity have approached it in slightly 
different ways, depending on the context. This makes 
writing a synthesis report somewhat challenging, so we 
have framed our analysis around the role of capacity 
development in improving service delivery and its role in 
processes of state-building. While this does not answer 
a discrete research question, it is an effective way to 
bring together the varied material and draw out general 
themes and recommendations from the relevant studies. 
In the analysis that follows, we include a series of text 
boxes to highlight the country-level research that feeds 
into specific findings. Throughout, we also use bold font 
to identify SLRC’s focus countries, helping readers to 
distinguish between the Consortium’s own findings and 
those originating from the wider literature. 
The Sierra Leone programme has most directly examined 
capacity development, looking at the ways in which this 
practice has unfolded in the prevention of malnutrition 
(Denney et al., 2014a; 2014b; 2015a) and teenage 
pregnancy (Denney et al., 2015b; 2016). The focus has 
been less targeted in other countries, but the analyses 
and findings are nonetheless highly relevant, including 
evidence on: 
 ■ community development and public goods provision 
in Afghanistan (Jackson, 2016; Pain, 2016) 
 ■ health systems in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) (Bwimana, forthcoming)
 ■ local peacebuilding committees (Tandukar et al., 
2016), local governance and community development 
(Acharya et al., 2016), and taxation in Nepal (Mallett 
et al., 2016a)
 ■ post-conflict livelihood reconstruction in Pakistan 
(Shah and Shahbaz, 2015) 
 ■ water and sanitation (Lall, 2015), and education in Sri 
Lanka (Lall, 2017)
3 Not all Consortium partners have addressed these issues, concerned as 
they are with other parts of the SLRC’s overarching research agenda. For 
other synthesis reports, see Nixon and Mallett (2017) on the relationship 
between service delivery, public perceptions and state legitimacy, Maxwell 
et al. (2017) on livelihoods, conflict and recovery, Mallett and Pain (2017) 
on markets, conflict and recovery, and Sturge et al. (2017) on findings from 
SLRC’s cross-country panel survey.
2 Methodology: 
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 ■ municipal economic regulation in northern Uganda 
(Mallett et al., 2016b)
 ■ state-building policy and practice in South Sudan 
(Maxwell and Santschi, 2014; Maxwell et al., 2014; 
Maxwell et al., 2015; Maxwell et al., 2016). 
The findings from this broad body of research were 
also considered in the context of a review of the wider 
literature on capacity and capacity development. This 
includes both grey literature, often focused on the 
technical ways of undertaking capacity development, 
as well as academic literature that seeks to analyse the 
‘stuff’ of capacity and critique its mainstream practice. 
As the SLRC authors have sought to situate their findings 
within current and evolving debates, the material that 
we draw upon cuts across how capacity development is 
practised as well as how it is thought about within the aid 
community.
Image: Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Secretariat board meeting. Credit: Richard Mallett, edited by James Mauger.
5The concept of capacity development has achieved a 
staggering consensus in international development, 
accepted as a central component of programming. This 
consensus can result in a kind of mythic status that 
obscures more than it reveals. Yet the particular focus of 
capacity development has changed over time, depending 
on the wider political purposes for which it has been 
deployed (Eade, 1997). 
This section briefly traces capacity development’s 
evolution, with a view to uncovering the political dimension 
that is often obscured by technocratic language. This 
political dimension matters, because it fundamentally 
shapes trajectories of capacity development as well as 
the wider visions of development and change to which it 
contributes.
3.1 The early origins of aid and capacity 
development: technical assistance 
(1940s-50s)
Early ideas of capacity development emerged in the 
1930s-40s, with colonial powers undertaking technical 
assistance as part of a ‘civilising mission’ to impart 
modern ideas of public administration to colonies. At this 
time, ‘waves of experts’ were sent to change agricultural 
techniques and reform colonial health and education 
systems (Cooper, 1997). The model colonial officer 
was described as ‘a technical expert, who knew how to 
eradicate malaria, organise a school system, teach new 
cultivation techniques or manage labour disputes’ (Cooper, 
2002: 88). 
In 1949, President Truman’s Point IV Programme in the 
United States (US) set out a plan for providing technical 
assistance to developing countries, intended to: ‘make 
available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store 
of technical knowledge in order to help them realise their 
aspirations for a better life’ (President Truman quoted in 
Rist, 2006: 71). Experts were sent to countries to transfer 
skills and knowledge about private-sector development, 
governance reforms and public-service delivery. While 
the programme was branded with developmental aims, 
it also provided a means for combatting communism 
and preventing ‘nationalistic tendencies’ in developing 
countries, thought to undermine the post-World War II 
order (de Senarclens, 1997). Yet, as Rist (2006: 76) notes, 
Truman’s speech was so effective, in part, because the 
proposal: 
claimed to be beyond the ideological divide between 
capitalism and communism. The key to prosperity 
3 The political 
nature of 
capacity 
development: a 
short history
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and happiness was increased production, not endless 
debate about the organisation of society, ownership 
of the means of production or the role of the State. 
By focusing efforts on improving developing countries’ 
gross national income through technical assistance, 
the Point IV Programme planted the seed for ‘national 
statistics, with their mathematical aura of objectivity’ as 
the basis for judging progress (ibid.). This focus on the 
technical elements and measures of capacity continues 
today, presenting deeply political ideas about progress as 
value-neutral matters (Kenny and Clarke, 2010). 
To coordinate technical assistance, the United Nations 
(UN) established the Expanded Programme of Technical 
Assistance (EPTA) in 1949, which worked alongside the 
Technical Assistance Board (TAB) and the Technical 
Assistance Committee (TAC) of the Economic and 
Social Council (de Senarclens, 1997: 196). These were 
precursors to some of the international institutions at the 
forefront of capacity development today – most notably, 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
(UNESCO, 2016).  
From the 1950s, technical assistance was provided 
throughout the developing world by the US and Soviet 
Union, as liberation movements spread and the global 
superpowers vied for ideological supremacy. In addition, 
because superpower rivalry hamstrung the Security 
Council, the UN preoccupied itself with activities outside 
of ‘peace and security’, including using technical 
assistance for development (Rist, 2006). Multilateral 
organisations believed their assistance to be apolitical 
in contrast to bilateral donors, and would help newly 
independent countries to improve economic growth 
(Wilson, 2007). As such, technical assistance largely 
focused on supporting economic planning and attracting 
foreign investment (de Senarclens, 1997; Jolly, 2010; 
Wilson, 2007: 183). 
3.2 Beyond the state: from citizen participation 
to	structural	adjustment	(1960s–80s)
By the late-1960s, there was widespread disappointment 
at the achievements of the ‘development decade’ 
(Jolly, 2010; Wilson, 2007). Such concerns came at 
the same time as ideas grew – particularly among civil 
society and grass-roots social-change movements 
– that people and politics were integral to theories 
of development. These ideas sat in tension with the 
top-down statist development  planning initiatives that 
had dominated to date (Kenny and Clarke, 2010). This 
emphasis on empowerment and participation continued 
into the 1970s, as Latin American liberation theories 
of development spread, which argued for people-led 
movements instead of dependency on western donors 
(Cardoso, 1972; Freire, 1970). 
At the same time, the concept of technical assistance 
as an apolitical transfer of skills for improved efficiency 
became further institutionalised under Robert 
McNamara’s presidency at the World Bank (1968-81). 
McNamara introduced tools to enable ‘the scientific 
determination of correct investment choices’, borrowed 
from his previous leadership of the US Department 
of Defense (Hirschman, 1995: 128). An interest in 
improving aid results led to the introduction of the 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System and the 
logical framework (‘logframe’), giving political decisions 
a ‘technocratic aura’ (ibid.). These tools constituted early 
efforts to quantify capacity development activities that 
continue today (Natsios, 2010).  
Until this time, much capacity development had 
concentrated on supporting states to develop economic 
plans, deliver services and improve management, 
which reflected broader ideas about the state’s role in 
developmental processes. This began to shift with the 
emphasis on participation and people-led development, 
however, as civil society itself became a target for 
capacity development. But by 1980, as foreign debt 
spiralled and conservative governments emerged in the 
US and United Kingdom (UK), ideas about limiting the 
state’s role gained traction. The idea was embodied by 
structural adjustment initiatives, which sought to reduce 
the state’s role in the economy and drastically cut social 
spending. International assistance became increasingly 
conditional upon macroeconomic policy compliance, with 
capacity development reoriented towards supporting the 
kinds of institutional and policy reforms demanded by 
structural adjustment (Moss, 2007; Trostle et al., 1997).  
From its earliest development through to the 1990s, 
structural adjustment attracted forceful critique (Easterly, 
2003), with some arguing that its focus on increasing 
finances was misplaced, and that ‘weak institutional 
capacity may be a more important obstacle to poverty 
reduction’ (Venner, 2015: 87). Concerns also emerged 
from within the UN, with the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), UNICEF and the Economic Commission 
for Africa criticising the impact of structural adjustment on 
human development (Jolly, 2010). Yet, it was not until the 
1990s, with the rise of the human development agenda, 
that trends in international assistance shifted (ibid.).
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3.3 Bringing the state back in: governance and 
‘national	ownership’	(1990s-2000s)
In many ways, debates about the state’s role in 
development have provided the backdrop to shifts 
in capacity development. As criticism of structural 
adjustment mounted, popular ideas returned to the role 
of the state and of institutions and governance (Grindle, 
2010). This saw the rise of the ‘good governance’ agenda 
in the 1990s, which embraced the role of politics in 
development (albeit in a highly normative manner) and 
reflected the belief in liberal democracy as the ‘end of 
history’ (Fukuyama, 1989). 
Good governance ideas had implications for capacity 
development, revealing a whole host of areas where 
support was needed. As Grindle (2004: 525-6) notes, good 
governance called for: 
improvements that touch virtually all aspects of the 
public sector – from institutions that set the rules 
of the game for economic and political interaction, 
to decision-making structures that determine 
priorities among public problems and allocate 
resources to respond to them, to organisations that 
manage administrative systems and deliver goods 
and services to citizens, to human resources that 
staff government bureaucracies, to the interface of 
officials and citizens in political and bureaucratic 
arenas.  
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s the international 
community was also reflecting on its own ways of working. 
In 1993 the UNDP released its seminal ‘Berg Report’ 
on technical cooperation, which critiqued mainstream 
approaches to capacity development (Berg, 1993). The 
report called out development agencies for adhering 
to their own agendas rather than responding to needs 
in recipient countries, and criticised some of the main 
modalities of support, such as placing highly-paid 
internationals in government roles while national civil 
servants remained poorly remunerated (Land et al., 
2015). The findings contributed to the creation of a 
Technical Cooperation Network within the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) (ibid.). 
Language also began to shift from capacity building 
to capacity development: while the former implies an 
4 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm and  
www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/busanpartnership.htm.
5 See http://www.newdeal4peace.org.
‘externally and top-down defined process’ focused on 
inputs, the latter suggests existing local capacities and 
endogenous drivers of development (Petersen and 
Engberg-Pedersen, 2013: 20).
The OECD-DAC has continued to coordinate global efforts 
to improve aid effectiveness, organising high-level forums 
that have resulted in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, and 
the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation.4 Underpinning all of these initiatives has 
been an attempt to reconfigure aid relationships towards 
local ownership and sustainability. 
3.4 Conflict,	fragility	and	the	state-building	
agenda	(2000s	onwards)
The 2000s also saw capacity development become 
intertwined with issues of conflict and security. Rising 
concern about failed or fragile states and ungoverned 
spaces recast state capacity as an instrument to 
maintain national and international peace (and prevent 
spill-over of the effects of conflict to other countries) (van 
Overbeek et al., 2009). Underdevelopment, conflict and 
terrorism came to be associated with an absence of state 
governance (Boege et al., 2009), the logical solution being 
to create or restore the formal government structures 
believed capable of delivering development and achieving 
a monopoly on violence, including through capacity 
development initiatives.
The move towards state-building as the primary 
framework for development in fragile states was 
furthered in 2011, when the Fourth High Level Forum on  
Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) agreed the New Deal for 
Engagement in Fragile States5 as part of wider 
efforts to improve aid practice in fragile settings. Also 
published that year was the World Bank’s (2011) 
World Development Report on Conflict, Security and 
Development, which similarly recognises capacity 
development’s importance in fragile situations, 
specifically in security, justice and jobs. From this 
perspective, capacity development is understood as the 
key to not only local ownership, but peace, stability, and 
transforming entire states and societies.  
The more recent focus on conflict and fragility as a middle-
income-country phenomenon, as opposed to something 
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solely affecting the ‘bottom billion’ (Collier, 2007), is 
now challenging ideas about state-building and capacity 
development. In conflict-affected middle-income states, 
capacity is not necessarily in short supply, but rather 
political incentives are stacked against accountable and 
responsive governance. There are thus questions about 
how ideas of capacity development need to be adapted 
in order to remain relevant to these new conflicts – or, in 
other words, about how capacity development needs to 
engage with processes of political change.
This short historical overview captures how politics 
fundamentally shapes capacity development, from ideas 
about its core purpose, to who should (and should not) 
be its primary focus. Efforts to improve the practice of 
capacity development at the technical level continue, 
and have made important strides in recognising existing 
capacities, the importance of mutual learning, and the 
primacy of locally-led development. But the technical 
can also distract from or mask the underlying politics of 
change (Centano and Ferraro, 2013). We need to be aware 
of this politics, because it affects what seemingly technical 
capacity development efforts contribute to – whether 
that be winning an ideological debate in the Cold War, or 
contributing to narratives about violent extremism and 
migration being more effectively dealt with ‘at source’.
Image: interview, Nepal. Credit: Georgina Sturge, edited by James Mauger.
9As a pillar of the contemporary state-building agenda – 
and of development practice more broadly – what does 
capacity support to states in fragile and conflict-affected 
situations look like today? 
It is important to recognise the gains that have been 
made, and not to unfairly denigrate capacity development 
efforts. That said, there remain various shortcomings, 
which will be familiar to many readers, in the way that 
capacity development is often deployed, and that 
fundamentally undermine efforts to strengthen state 
capacity to deliver services. 
The scope of SLRC’s research in this area is limited 
to service delivery. More specifically, it looks at how 
international support is being used (or not) to strengthen 
states’ capacity to deliver services (normatively 
considered a ‘core function’ of the typical modern state). 
The research is therefore concerned with a particular type 
of capacity, and cannot be considered representative of 
all state-building contexts as it draws on a selection of 
focus countries and sectors. Thus, while the comparative 
nature of the programme’s research is certainly one of 
its strengths – and something many other studies lack 
– any generalisations come with a note of caution. In an 
effort to address this caveat, we draw on wider literature 
to connect the SLRC findings with research from other 
contexts, and identify four cross-cutting findings:
1 Training is the default tool of capacity development.
2 Power and politics are central to how services are 
delivered, but capacity development often focuses on 
technical aspects.
3 Capacity development currently focuses on (parts of) 
the state, largely overlooking ‘alternative’ capacities 
and how people use services in practice. 
4 Getting beyond the ‘units’ of the system to engage 
with ‘systemic capacity’ remains an ongoing 
challenge.
The remainder of this section looks at each finding in turn, 
with key messages highlighted at the beginning of each 
sub-section and illustrative examples from SLRC research 
pinpointed throughout.
4 Key	findings
 Service delivery and state capacity: findings from the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium
10
4.1 Training is the default tool of capacity 
development
Key Messages
 ■ Despite the wide range of possible capacity support 
activities, programming tends to favour the tangible 
and quantifiable approaches of training and 
resource supply.
 ■ The models used often have internal design 
weaknesses: for example, many trainings are 
underpinned by flawed learning methodologies and 
are inappropriate to the context.
 ■ Trainings often assume that knowledge is the 
‘missing ingredient’, and therefore are based on a 
limited conceptualisation of how change happens.
Despite how broadly capacity development is often 
defined, it tends to be operationalised in a relatively 
narrow, homogenised manner through a limited range 
of interventions. These approaches tend to look much 
the same from one place to the next, regardless of 
differences in context that are meant to drive programme 
design. This is despite the fact that, in relation to service 
delivery, there are a number of forms that capacity 
development activities might take (Gillespie, 2001: 24, 
drawing on Heaver, 2000), including:
 ■ training staff
 ■ supply of equipment or resources
 ■ technical assistance, involving inserting external 
experts to provide analysis and advice
 ■ mentoring and supportive supervision
 ■ study tours and exchanges
 ■ salary support
 ■ organisational restructuring (hiring practices, payroll, 
incentive structures, working environment)
 ■ improving coordination mechanisms between 
relevant stakeholders
 ■ brokering dialogue among relevant stakeholders to 
improve planning, problem-solving, implementation
 ■ developing and harmonising reporting systems and 
data flows
 ■ strengthening accountability and improving 
feedback loops. 
SLRC’s research suggests that, in practice, there is 
often a strong reliance on a narrow selection of tools, 
most notably training and the supply of equipment or 
resources. These are routinely included in programming 
as a way of achieving ‘sustainability’ beyond the life of 
the intervention. 
The reliance on a limited set of tools is particularly 
evident in SLRC’s work in Sierra Leone, where 
researchers have looked at dominant approaches to 
capacity development in three areas: 1) the nutrition 
sector (Denney et al., 2014a; 2014b); 2) health-system 
strengthening since the end of the civil war (Denney et 
al., 2015a); and 3) teenage pregnancy following a spike 
during the Ebola outbreak (Denney et al., 2015b; 2016). 
In each of these sectors, the Sierra Leone research 
maps the kinds of capacity development provided by a 
range of bilateral and multilateral donors and local and 
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The 
dominance of training and the provision of equipment / 
supplies as the primary mode of support is striking. This 
is not to suggest that there were no alternative forms of 
capacity development – secondments, salary support and 
organisational restructuring were also used – but these 
pale in comparison to the dominant forms of assistance.
SLRC’s research in Nepal similarly points to a strong 
focus on training (Acharya et al., 2016), as do findings 
from South Sudan, where the provision of equipment and 
infrastructure is also common (Maxwell et al., 2016a). Box 
1 highlights the uniformity of capacity initiatives found to 
be used in these three countries.
This reliance on a limited set of capacity development 
tools is also noted in the wider literature, suggesting 
a problem that runs beyond the SLRC research sites. 
Training, alongside the provision of equipment and 
resources, is often identified as one of the most widespread 
applications of capacity development across a range of 
contexts and sectors (Boesen and Therkildsen, 2004; 
Petersen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2013; UNDP, 2009). 
One evaluation of Australian aid, for example, finds that 
capacity development efforts principally focus on training, 
limiting the effectiveness of building sustained capacity. 
In Nepal, it highlights that teacher training should have 
been ‘supplemented with other forms of capacity support 
such as secondments, peer learning and exchange, and 
on-the-job training in order for teaching skills to improve’ 
(ODE: 2014: 18). In their analysis of capacity development 
in the context of health systems, Potter and Brough 
(2004: 336) state that, ‘Too often [capacity development] 
becomes a euphemism referring to little more than training’. 
The authors go on to highlight examples where capacity 
development is equated with training and support, arguing 
that these could be ‘multiplied many times’ (ibid.: 337). 
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And finally, a recent synthesis by the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) on capacity development 
and security sector reform similarly notes a reliance on 
a narrow set of strategies characterised by training and 
technical assistance (Denney and Valters, 2015). 
Training is tangible and measurable
Modalities of capacity development such as training 
and equipment / resource supply have the distinct 
benefit of being tangible and measurable. From building 
schools, clinics and water pumps in South Sudan, to 
running trainings and setting up community groups in 
Sierra Leone, both the inputs and outputs can be easily 
recorded and reported. Indeed, some argue that the 
reason that training is used so much as a modality of 
capacity development is because of its quantifiable 
nature (Vallejo and Wehn, 2016). 
While NGO staff are often keenly aware of the limitations 
of such support, the use of training (which can be 
counted, along with participants) and the provision 
Box 1: SLRC	research	finds	narrowly	operationalised	capacity	development
The nutrition sector in Sierra Leone (Denney et al.,	2014a:	12)
In this report, the authors note the following:
What emerges [from the analysis] … is the frequency with which training appears as a form of capacity support. 
This suggests not only the dominance of this particular modality among development partners but also 
the tendency for capacity development to target ‘skills and knowledge’ almost exclusively through training. 
The interviews were illustrative: respondents, when asked about the forms of capacity support provided to 
government, tended to immediately cite training (as opposed to any other kinds of support provided), indicating 
that this is how capacity development is often framed and understood.
The health system in Sierra Leone (Denney et al.,	2015a:	vi)
Moving from the nutrition sector to a broader focus on Sierra Leone’s health system, researchers similarly found that,
‘Capacity building’ has been [since the end of the war in 2002] thought about and operationalised in a limited 
manner. Although there are constraints on the methods and functions of development partners, an overly 
technocratic, narrow and linear way of thinking about capacity and how it might be developed has resulted in a 
focus on building technical skills and knowledge at the “individual” and “organisational” levels of the health sector.
Teenage pregnancy in Sierra Leone (Denney et al.,	2015b:	14,	20)
Strong parallels came out of the later research into teenage pregnancy:
Given the different understandings of the problem of teenage pregnancy … it is not surprising that we also 
see different approaches to addressing this problem amongst development partners. That said, there is 
also a surprising degree of consistency of intervention types adopted from each of these relatively siloed 
understandings of the problem; a lot of organisations are doing similar things. […] [Government of Sierra Leone] 
and NGO activities overwhelmingly focus on the level of individuals – mostly girls – targeting their skills and 
knowledge and providing them with resources, with the assumption that this will lead to behaviour change 
resulting in fewer teenage pregnancies.
Peacebuilding	in	South	Sudan	(Maxwell et al.,	2016a)
Workshops were found to be a particularly common modality of support, ambitiously relied upon to achieve complex 
social transformations, such as those in relation to local justice or peacebuilding. This was instead of drawing on 
a wider range of capacity development activities seen to be necessary to achieve such transformations (Leonardi 
et al., 2010). Moreover, as Maxwell et al. (2016a: 3) note, ‘Numerous schools, clinic facilities and boreholes were 
built … without a realistic plan for government institutions to assume responsibility for their sustained operation’.
The	provision	of	water	services	in	Nepal (Acharya et al.,	2016)
Investments in drinking water channelled through the Local Governance and Community Development Programme 
(LGCDP) were used to build bigger water reservoirs and to replace pipelines. At the same time, however, evidence 
suggests that far less was done to support the government’s capacity to maintain these services. Where problems 
arise, it is usually the de facto responsibility of local communities to handle repairs.
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of equipment and resources (which are quantifiable) 
continues. Moreover, capacity development in relation 
to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) can itself reinforce 
this emphasis on the quantifiable. According to a recent 
assessment of aid support in DRC, for example, while 
the focus on building M&E capacity was welcome, this 
was generally for upward accountability to the donor, as 
opposed to downward accountability to beneficiaries or 
to encourage learning or critical reflection (Bulte et al., 
2015). This speaks to the ways in which the aid industry’s 
wider political economy shapes the design of capacity 
development activities, as discussed in section 5. 
But there are limitations to the models used
In addition to the overwhelming focus on training, SLRC 
and wider research suggests there are also limitations to 
the training itself. 
First, models often rely on a ‘train-the-trainer’ approach. 
The benefit of this design is that it has the potential to 
reach a wide target audience in a relatively short time. 
However, SLRC research in Sierra Leone suggests that 
such training models can act more like a process of 
‘Chinese whispers’ in practice, with the message that is 
delivered at the beginning being markedly different from 
that which is received at the end of the chain (Denney et 
al., 2014a). 
Second, trainings can be poorly adapted to local context. 
In South Sudan, chiefs were recurrently invited to 
workshops or trainings on their role in local governance, 
justice or peacebuilding. Yet these trainings were usually 
conducted in English, were based on abstract ideas, and 
provided little space for exchange and participation of 
the chiefs themselves (see Leonardi et al., 2010).
Third, training is often short-term. This is partly because 
those delivering the programme do not want to keep 
participants from their jobs for long periods. At the same 
time, however, this has implications for both the depth 
of learning, and the likelihood that participants retain 
accurate knowledge. While there is no agreement on 
ideal length of training, evidence from the wider literature 
suggests that a series of short-term trainings over time, 
as opposed to simple one-off trainings, can be more 
effective at improving and sustaining participants’ 
learning experiences (Chemin, 2009; Mobekk, 2009). 
Often, capacity building trainings that target adults are 
‘classroom’ based – as illustrated by the SLRC research 
in South Sudan (Maxwell et al., 2016a) and Sierra Leone 
(Denney et al., 2014a) – which overlooks the importance 
of practical on-the-job-training, mentoring and follow-
up that can facilitate learning and reinforcement (see 
Murray, 2007).
Finally, and related to the above point, despite the 
substantial investments made in training, they are rarely 
underpinned by explicit learning methodologies. Trainings 
are often operationalised as a relatively straightforward 
transfer of knowledge from provider to recipients, rarely 
bringing to bear the wealth of literature on adult-learning 
techniques, learning methods across cultures, or learning 
aids for limited literacy. 
Taken together, capacity development tends to be 
thought of as a common-sense activity that gets tacked 
on to other interventions (Baser, 2014). It is considered 
to be the mechanism by which an intervention is made 
sustainable, and not as an intervention in its own right. 
This filters through to who conducts training. While in 
some cases this may be experienced trainers, in many 
others it may be staff with technical but not necessarily 
teaching/training expertise. This matters because being 
a good nurse or government official does not mean 
you necessarily know how to train others. To ensure 
that training actually develops capacities, we therefore 
need to reflect on the methodologies that underpin it 
and engage with the complexity of learning in different 
contexts.
Training assumes knowledge is the missing ingredient
The tendency to rely on training as the dominant form of 
capacity development reflects how popular understandings 
of capacity tend to centre on knowledge as the primary 
missing ingredient. The logic here is that by providing 
(often technical) knowledge to recipients, they will be able 
to deliver or access services better, or hold governments 
to account. This emphasis is reflected in many monitoring 
tools, such as beneficiary surveys, which are intended to 
demonstrate whether a capacity development intervention 
has resulted in improved knowledge.
Knowledge is of course a vital aspect of capacity: without 
knowing how to treat malnutrition, health workers are ill-
equipped to save lives. Or without knowing that domestic 
violence is a crime, survivors do not report it. The problem 
is that knowledge, in and of itself, is rarely sufficient to 
lead to behaviour change.
In reality, the way in which (and extent to which) 
knowledge translates into practice depends on the nature 
of an individual’s surrounding environment. Are the right 
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conditions in place to support the behaviour changes that 
are being sought? This is often referred to as an ‘enabling 
environment’, where the wider context facilitates the 
desired behaviour changes. In such a setting, knowledge 
transfer may enable behaviour change. In many cases, 
however, what we find are ‘disabling environments’ that 
work against translating knowledge into practice.
Such environments can emerge where material or ‘hard’ 
constraints exist. For instance, a health worker can be 
trained in the latest best practice, but if they do not have 
a reliable drug supply or electricity or water at the clinic, 
then providing knowledge alone will not result in better 
development outcomes. Disabling environments can 
also emerge when social norms, beliefs and expectations 
– the ‘softer’ side of constraints, as it were – are stacked 
against the desired behaviour change. For example, 
SLRC’s Sierra Leone research shows that, even when 
young mothers know about the importance of exclusive 
breastfeeding, their ability to translate this into practice 
is often limited by power relations in the household; this 
is particularly the case when husbands and mothers-in-
law have greater decision-making power over household 
finances (Mallett and Denney, 2014). In much the 
same way, while providing teenage girls with knowledge 
about family planning is an important step, shame, 
peer pressure and a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis 
male sexual partners – related in turn to wider gender 
inequities – can mean that their ability to act on this 
knowledge is similarly restricted (Denney et al., 2016). 
This phenomenon has been noted in other cases, and is 
in keeping with the recognition that people’s behaviour 
and decisions are generally influenced by a range of 
factors, of which knowledge is just one. A particularly 
telling example comes from the Ebola epidemic in Sierra 
Leone, where ‘knowledge, attitude and practice’ studies 
show that people had reasonable knowledge of both the 
symptoms associated with Ebola as well as the reporting 
pathways available. Yet, despite this, many did not report 
cases, often out of fear, a sense of hopelessness, distrust 
of authorities, and alternative beliefs about healing 
(Focus 1000, 2014a; 2014b). 
These findings are not terribly surprising. It has long been 
known in social psychology and behavioural economics 
that the relationship between attitudes and behaviours 
is complex and non-linear (Jackson, 2005; Owens and 
Driffill, 2008). A wide body of literature has developed 
around this theme in relation to both consumer choice 
and environmental action, where changes in people’s 
knowledge and attitudes have not been strongly correlated 
to people’s behaviour (ibid.). This has led to critiques of 
the ‘information-deficit model’, and specifically its ‘failure 
to take account of the social, cultural and institutional 
contexts in which attitudes and behaviours are formed’ 
(ibid.: 4413). In order to be more effective at delivering 
improved development outcomes, capacity development 
must therefore take a broader approach – focusing not just 
on knowledge, but on creating an enabling environment in 
which that knowledge can be put to use appropriately. 
Image: trainee tailor, Afghanistan. Credit: Richard Mallett, edited by James Mauger.
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4.2 Power	and	politics	are	central	to	how	
services are delivered, but capacity 
development often focuses on technical 
aspects
Key messages
 ■ Capacity development is often treated as a 
technical exercise, involving the transfer of 
‘best practice’ models guided by a series of 
predetermined normative outcomes.
 ■ But in practice, state capacity to deliver services is 
shaped by a series of factors related to power and 
politics, such as elite behaviour.
 ■ Capacity is also influenced by the distribution of 
power within society more broadly, including the 
‘invisible’ forces of informal institutions and social 
norms that regulate individual and group behaviour.
Capacity development is often treated as a technical 
exercise 
The SLRC studies suggest that capacity development in 
fragile and conflict-affected situations tends to focus on 
the technical dimensions of service delivery, overlooking 
how power and politics shape or constrain possible action 
(see Box 2 for examples). 
Given the history of capacity development summarised in 
section 3, this focus on the technical aspects of capacity 
should perhaps be expected. As Clarke and Oswald (2010: 
3) point out, while there are several perspectives on what 
capacity development is ‘about’, the dominant approach 
in policy circles is to treat it as a ‘technical solution to 
a technical problem’. Indeed, it has been argued that 
‘standard responses to public sector management 
deficits in developing countries’ have long continued to 
focus on ‘a combination of technical efficiency-enhancing 
reforms based on neoliberal market models and [New 
Public Management] principles and tools’ (Brinkerhoff 
and Brinkerhoff, 2015: 222). As such, donor-funded 
programming, particularly in fragile situations where 
state structures are often thought of as having collapsed, 
continues to concentrate on what Petersen and Engberg-
Pedersen (2013) call ‘the functional-rational’ aspects of 
organisations. This refers to procedures, structures and 
staffing policies that aim to improve internal efficiency and 
effectiveness, such as by getting the ‘right’ technology 
in place and making sure staff possess the appropriate 
competencies (Barma et al., 2014). Certainly, these are 
important aspects of organisational capacity: as recent 
research demonstrates, good technical analysis, advice 
and assistance often sit at the heart of effective central-
state strengthening in fragile situations (ibid.).
However, just as ‘missing knowledge’ is only one part of 
the problem, so too are technical solutions only partial 
answers. Often, these technical approaches focus on 
implementing organisational forms that resemble those 
of developed countries, yet fail to deliver the intended 
functions – resulting in what is known as ‘isomorphic 
mimicry’ (Andrews et al., 2015). Building on an established 
evidence base, SLRC’s research shows that the way 
in which a state’s capacity to provide services – and, 
importantly, to deliver and maintain good service-delivery 
outcomes – is fundamentally shaped by power and 
politics (see also Foresti et al., 2013; Hickey et al., 2016; 
Mcloughlin and Batley, 2012). This is true across multiple 
contexts, and sits in distinct contrast to the technical 
approach favoured by so much capacity support. 
This technical focus is exacerbated by the fact that 
capacity development programmes are usually 
Box 2: SLRC	research	finds	capacity	development	with	
a primary focus on technical support
Health-related trainings in Sierra Leone (Denney et al., 
2014a;	2014b;	2016)
Trainings tend to privilege technical knowledge and know-
how, overlooking the ‘softer’ (or relational) aspects of 
capacity: mothers are trained in the nutritional benefits 
of exclusive breastfeeding, health staff in diagnosing 
and treating a range of basic healthcare problems, and 
teenage girls in family-planning methods.
Government trainings in South Sudan	(Maxwell et al., 
2016c)
Government officials are trained in the technical 
aspects of their duties only, overlooking the 
relationships with the communities that they are 
employed to serve, and the elites who hold power. 
Health sector support in DRC	(Bwimana,	forthcoming)
While a wide range of external actors is involved in DRC’s 
health sector, assistance tends to consist of financial 
and technical support to government. Moreover, the 
majority of this support has been channelled towards 
humanitarian, emergency-based interventions, with very 
little being used for longer-term system strengthening.
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designed by international experts who are technical 
sectoral specialists (e.g. in health, education, security, 
water and sanitation) with experience in a range of 
countries (Maxwell et al., 2016a). This is not necessarily 
problematic if deep contextual knowledge is similarly 
balanced in designing interventions. But local knowledge 
tends to be a lens through which technical knowledge 
is refracted, rather than being a determining force in 
itself. Technical capacity development then becomes the 
answer when ‘capacity problems’ are defined in terms 
of technical resource, skill and knowledge deficits. In 
other words, defining the problem in such a way logically 
creates and legitimises a particular kind of response. But 
in doing so, it writes the less visible factors of power and 
politics out of the picture, despite the fact that donor and 
agency staff often already know that power and politics 
are central to how services are delivered and used.
In practice, capacity is shaped by elite behaviour
From the SLRC material we see the ‘disrupting’ effects of 
power and politics manifest in at least two ways, with the 
first concerning the behaviours of those who hold political 
power, in particular pre-existing elites. The evidence 
speaks most strongly to dynamics unfolding at the sub-
national level, as the examples in Box 3 illustrate.
It is not always in people’s interests to tolerate either 
stronger states or new formal governance structures, 
especially for those who have benefited from pre-existing 
arrangements. For many, the status quo – often deemed 
by outsiders as broken, misaligned, or lacking capacity – 
works (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). The wider state-building 
literature suggests this is often particularly the case in 
situations of fragility, where certain elites might have an 
Box 3: SLRC	research	identifies	‘disrupting’	effects	of	power	and	politics	at	the	sub-national	level
Community	development	councils	(CDCs)	in	Afghanistan	(Pain,	2016)
The introduction of CDCs under the National Solidarity Program (NSP) was designed to improve the provision of local 
public goods by bringing village governance into line with principles of democracy, participation and accountability. 
However, the capacity of the Councils to operate democratically and of community members to participate were 
constrained by the behaviour of local elites (driven in turn by incentives confronting them). Rather than transform 
relations and power within villages, the CDCs essentially took on the same characteristics of the existing power 
structure, with the same figures having power and influence within the Councils. 
Governance reforms in Afghanistan	(Jackson,	2015;	Minoia	and	Pain,	2016;	Minoia et al.,	2014)
Research in Kandahar, Afghanistan highlights how sub-national governance reforms ‘focused largely on building 
technical capacity, [and] have consistently neglected to address the factors and forces that undermine the viability 
of state institutions’ (Jackson, 2015: 7). For Jackson, the most important of these factors relates to the behaviours 
of, and incentives faced by, regional power holders, who have the ‘capacity’ to manipulate access to resources. 
Further research into the workings of rural commodity markets shows how both price and market access are tightly 
controlled by a narrow group of powerful traders. 
Peacebuilding committees (Tandukar et al.,	2016)	and	taxation	in	Nepal (Mallett et al.,	2016a)
In a study of peacebuilding committees in Nepal, these supposedly inclusive and representative bodies are found 
to be dominated by political parties (Tandukar et al., 2016). So too with the capacity of Nepal’s local government to 
raise revenue via taxation, as ‘control over planning and resources is dominated by local elites and political parties, 
rather than the [Village Development Committee] office’ (Mallett et al., 2016a: 10; see also The Asia Foundation, 
2012). The implication is that simply expanding the mandate of local government to take on more roles and 
responsibilities, for example through a decentralisation of decision-making, is unlikely to have much effect unless 
the underlying power relations of local governance are somehow reordered.
Regeneration of a municipal marketplace in Uganda (Mallett et al.,	2016b)
The technical design of a new marketplace in Lira, northern Uganda overlooked power relationships in the 
community, enabling already (relatively) wealthy vendors to take advantage of prime trading units. Although in its 
early days, evidence suggests this has contributed to the creation of a rentier class within the new marketplace, 
placing additional costs on poorer vendors and disincentivising their use of the space. In turn, this has compromised 
the capacity of the municipality to raise revenues from the redevelopment.
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active interest in maintaining disorder and weakness 
(Menkhaus, 2010). For example, in places where war 
economies are capable of producing lucrative rents, 
there may be great incentive for some in curbing the 
state’s capacity to regulate economic activity (and thereby 
maximising the size of the ‘shadow economy’) (Goodhand, 
2004). In other settings, where regime change is not in 
the interests of the elites in power, a ‘deinstitutionalised’ 
or gutless state might be considered a good thing: there 
are fewer challenges to power and weaker pressure for 
accountability (Reno, 2000). In such situations of wilful 
state fragility, there are no immediately obvious solutions 
to the problem of capacity, yet the standard state-building 
templates tend to forget this (Menkhaus, 2010).
Thus, the introduction of new organisations, rules and 
remits – driven to a large extent by the ‘deficit-based’ way 
in which capacity development is often thought about – 
often does little to reorder power relations, and so leads 
to limited change. Indeed, capacity development efforts 
might even find themselves being actively derailed, a 
consequence that Pain (2016) links to Pritchett’s (2015) 
idea of in/coherence in his work on the spatially varied 
effects of Afghanistan’s NSP. As Pain (2016: 13) argues, 
‘the NSP intervention in its design elements can in some 
respects and in some contexts … be incoherent in relation 
to the incentives and motivations that structure community 
life’. Where such cases emerge, significant change is 
unlikely to follow: the logics and norms of the incoming 
programme are simply too far removed from the realities of 
the local context. What is required, therefore, is more fine-
grained analysis of political and institutional variation – on 
a village-by-village basis (ibid.).
Capacity is also shaped by the distribution of power within 
societies more broadly
The tendency to write power and politics out of the 
picture – essentially turning capacity development into 
an engineering problem, where identifiable technical 
fixes produce known solutions – is noticeable at various 
levels. As discussed, this might be at the centres of 
political governance, where unaccountable regimes and 
members of the political elite resist change. But it is also 
evident within social relationships more broadly, visible in 
the everyday nature of personal interactions (should one 
choose to look there).
As we have already begun to see, much capacity 
development practice seems to be underpinned by 
a rational-actor logic that places great emphasis on 
agency (the framing of knowledge as the pathway to 
empowerment is a good illustration). But from a more 
relational perspective, we see that an individual’s capacity 
to operate in a certain way depends not only upon their 
internal competence (defined in various ways), but also 
upon their surroundings – specifically, their positioning 
within those surroundings relative to others (see Box 4). As 
Barma et al. (2014: 14-15) note: ‘Capacity development 
from this perspective, has to do with power, conflict and the 
Box 4: SLRC	research	finds	a	lack	of	focus	on	relational	aspects	of	capacity	development
Service delivery in South Sudan	(Maxwell et al.,	2016b)
Capacity development does not sufficiently involve a focus on relational aspects that are key to enabling effective 
service delivery. In particular, the lack of engagement with state-society relations – principally how citizens view, 
trust and interact with different parts of government across different locations – has been largely neglected, despite 
playing a strong role in people’s perception and experience of services.
Access to education in Sri Lanka	(Lall,	2017)
Deep social structures such as caste shape citizens’ access to education in Sri Lanka. The way in which ‘low’ caste 
identity intersects with a series of socio-economic factors – geographical residence, social status in the present, 
expected livelihood trajectories in the future – essentially means that ideas about where caste members ‘belong’ 
affects both the kinds of schools they are likely to attend, as well as the likelihood of full educational attainment. This 
is partly related to, and reinforced by, the pejorative attitudes held by some service providers. 
Access to healthcare in Sierra Leone (Denney et al.,	2014b)
Evidence suggests that negative experiences at the local health clinic, related in part to users’ feelings of ‘being 
looked down upon’ by staff, can deter future uptake of government-run services. Interestingly, this finding applies 
not only if an individual has themselves experienced negative service delivery, but also if they have heard stories of 
others in the community receiving poor service.
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mediation of different … interests. Capacity development is 
thus part of the political dynamics of a particular situation’.
Consider again the frontline health worker in rural Sierra 
Leone who provides poor care to her patients. Having 
been through various phases of technical training, she 
may possess the appropriate biomedical knowledge 
to diagnose and treat a range of basic health problems 
(although the use of ‘cascade’ training models may have 
diluted the accuracy of that knowledge). But when she has 
been posted to an unfamiliar part of the country, receives 
little supportive supervision, works in a clinic facing regular 
drug stock-outs, and has not been paid in three months, 
she sees little value in treating patients with the care that is 
required to build trust. As a result, she may resort to selling 
medicines on the black market to supplement her meagre 
income, charge informal user fees to patients, or treat them 
in a disrespectful manner. In turn, these practices can 
undermine people’s faith in the government’s capacity to 
provide quality health care (Boozary et al., 2014; Denney et 
al., 2015a; Tsai et al., 2015), potentially making them less 
likely to trust public health messaging from official channels, 
as was experienced during the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic.
Moving ‘up the chain’ of the health system, as it were, the 
SLRC evidence shows how informal power relations and 
identity politics can also constrain effective policy-making. 
Take the nutritionist of a remote district, responsible for 
promoting and coordinating all nutrition work in the area. 
She – and it usually is a she – sits within a District Health 
Management Team (DHMT). Plans and priorities are 
negotiated first through the DHMT, and then go through 
the bureaucratic machinery of the District Council. District 
nutritionists typically do not have a particularly strong 
position when it comes to negotiating for what they 
need within the DHMTs or District Councils, which is not 
helped by the fact that their roles are fairly recent (2009) 
additions to the DHMTs, as well as by the wider framing of 
nutrition as a ‘women’s issue’. As such, the nutritionist’s 
weak capability to influence, bargain and negotiate then 
acts as a broader constraint on state capacity to prevent 
malnutrition, as nutrition gets squeezed out of health plans 
and budgets (see Denney et al., 2015a). 
This is not about the nutritionist’s technical capacity per 
se, but rather her political positioning in relation to others 
at the district level. Neither is it about the hard aspects 
of organisational and systemic capacity. As the example 
shows, many of the structures are already in place: a DHMT, 
a District Council, planning meetings and processes. It is 
about the ways in which district nutritionists are subject, 
just as others are, to the rules of the game (which in this 
case are strongly patriarchal). These ‘rules’ are not only 
enforced in the private spheres of life, but can also run 
through the very organs of the state. 
The dynamics of human interaction occurring at this 
very granular level might seem distinct from the more 
‘conventional’ tasks of capacity development: bureaucratic 
restructuring, human resourcing, revenue generation. 
What, for example, does the young mother experiencing 
poor treatment at the local health clinic or the lower-caste 
parents seeking quality education for their son have to do 
with state capacity? 
But these are not separate issues. Neither are they 
straightforward, value-neutral or apolitical. Ultimately, the 
capacity of any state to deliver services depends on:
 ■ the way it engages with citizens, and the historical 
forces shaping that interaction. The attitudes and 
behaviours of frontline workers and local officials may 
be of particular importance, located as they are at the 
interface between state and society
 ■ the degree of individual and group compliance with the 
state
 ■ the extent to which the state is capable of displacing 
norms that sustain ‘detrimental’ behaviour.
4.3 Capacity development tends to focus on 
(parts	of)	the	state,	overlooking	‘alternative’	
capacities	and	how	people	use	services	in	
practice
Key messages
 ■ Current forms of capacity development are typically 
government-centric, focusing on the formal, 
bureaucratic apparatus of the state. 
 ■ There is often a tendency to overlook the 
‘alternative capacities’ of other authorities and 
providers, and little consideration of how citizens 
use services in practice.
 ■ Capacity support primarily targets governments 
but in uneven ways, with under-investments at the 
district or provincial level sometimes resulting in a 
‘missing middle’.
We have already examined the fact that, in practice, 
capacity support often gets channelled into a fairly narrow 
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range of interventions. To an extent, the same can be said 
of who gets targeted, with the SLRC material pointing to 
a certain selectivity in the way investments are allocated, 
based in turn on ideas about whose capacity matters 
most for state-building.
Government-centric capacity development is generally 
the norm
Contemporary capacity development efforts often focus 
primarily on the state – or, perhaps more accurately, the 
government (that is, the formal bureaucratic apparatus of 
the state) (see Box 5). This is not to say that other actors are 
never engaged with capacity development efforts. Indeed, 
in SLRC’s DRC research in particular, much of the capacity 
support analysed in that context was aimed at civil society 
rather than the government (Bwimana, forthcoming). 
Moreover, the focus of capacity development appears to 
shift across humanitarian and development boundaries. 
Yet despite these variations, much of SLRC’s research 
in this area saw capacity development being centrally 
focused on supporting government institutions.
6 This is arguably now shifting as instability is increasingly affecting middle-income countries that are not plagued by weak capacity but by exclusionary politics. 
Efforts may be shifting, therefore, to work around the state, rather than on it.
This government-centric focus is in keeping with 
wider trends in aid practice, in which the international 
community is focused on strengthening the formal 
state as a response to situations of perceived fragility or 
failure.6 This is apparent in the manner in which state-
building has become the overarching framework for 
much development practice (OECD, 2008), as well as 
in international commitments such as the 2011 New 
Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, which defines 
nationally-owned development as the goal and the 
government as the central authority to achieving that. In 
many cases, capacity development and state-building 
are thus conflated within current aid discourse. As others 
have noted, this results in a somewhat narrow model of 
state-building (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007). 
A focus on the capacity of government institutions is also 
apparent within the wider literature (see for instance, 
Call, 2008; Ghani and Lockhart, 2009; Grindle, 1997; 
Levy and Kpundeh, 2004), underscoring the particular 
forms of governance that are currently favoured by 
the international community for organising societies, 
Box 5: SLRC	research	finds	a	tendency	for	government-centric	capacity	development
Service delivery in South Sudan	(Maxwell et al.,	2016c)
While the development phase of international support in South Sudan concentrated on building the capacities of 
core government institutions, when conflict returned and international trust in the government declined, development 
partners shifted away from capacity support to direct delivery of services themselves, even bypassing non-state actors.
Service delivery through the government in Afghanistan	(Jackson,	2016)
In Afghanistan, SLRC research finds that core government ministries received the most international support. This 
is in keeping with the internationally agreed Afghanistan Compact, which captures the centrality of government-
focused support:
The Afghan Government will rapidly expand its capacity to provide basic services to the population throughout 
the country. It will recruit competent and credible professionals to public service on the basis of merit; establish 
a more effective, accountable, and transparent administration at all levels of Government; and implement 
measurable improvements in fighting corruption (ibid., 2).
Marketplace redevelopment in Uganda (Mallett et al.,	2016b)
The redevelopment of a marketplace in the north had multiple objectives. Alongside supporting the livelihoods of the 
town’s traders, this aid-funded initiative was also designed as a way to enhance government capacity to generate 
local revenue and to use that to finance municipal service delivery.
Health provision in Sierra Leone (Denney et al.,	2014a;	2014b)
SLRC research finds a focus on developing the capacities of both the central Ministry of Health and Sanitation, 
as well as government-run peripheral health units at the community level. Efforts to either harness or develop the 
capacities of non-government providers, such as traditional healers, were relatively few-and-far between.
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arranging power and delivering services. This tells us 
something about how power and authority are seen to be 
legitimately exercised, as well as what the intended role 
of government ought to look like against that backdrop – 
i.e. as a benevolent and desirable actor, as a legitimate 
representative of the population, as centrally responsible 
for service delivery (along with other core functions). 
And there is a tendency to overlook the ‘alternative 
capacities’ of other authorities and providers
The problem with a narrow view of governance and state-
building is that it leaves out the range of other actors and 
authorities that often form the wider political community, 
and on which people frequently rely for service provision 
(Barma et al., 2014). It is now generally accepted that ‘the 
state’ incorporates multiple layers of authority. Formal 
government is one of those, but in many places it exists 
as one part of a broader configuration. The literature on 
hybrid political orders (Boege et al., 2009), institutional 
multiplicity (Di John, 2008) and twilight institutions (Lund, 
2006) are testament to this. 
From SLRC’s research, actors constituting additional parts 
of these broader configurations of authority and provision 
include: 
 ■ chiefs and traditional healers in Sierra Leone
 ■ warlords and elders in Afghanistan
 ■ chiefs in South Sudan
 ■ the church in DRC. 
From a state-building perspective, authorities such 
as these are important for a number of reasons: they 
are often involved in service delivery, either directly or 
indirectly; they are sometimes considered more locally 
legitimate or trusted than formal government; and they 
are often more physically accessible and affordable for 
communities, especially those in remote locations. 
For example, SLRC’s longitudinal survey data from South 
Kivu, DRC shows that people there hold consistently 
more positive views of customary governance actors than 
formal government (Ferf et al., 2016). The Consortium’s 
wider cross-country survey work additionally suggests that 
where citizens experience problems with their services, 
their trust in government in many cases declines, which 
7 This research forms part of a collaborative project between SLRC and the International Centre on Tax and Development (ICTD), which looked at the relationships 
between taxation, livelihoods and governance in Nepal and Sierra Leone.
8 Jirga is described in the report as one of the major traditional institutions in Pakhtun culture, referring to an assembly of elders (‘white beards’) who take 
responsibility for settling communal matters and resolving disputes. Although jirgas lost de jure authority status in 1992, their power and influence remains visible 
in a de facto sense.
may help explain why people often end up turning to 
alternative providers (Sturge et al., 2017). And so too in 
Sierra Leone, where research finds that taxes imposed by 
non-government actors are generally seen as being fairer 
than those imposed by the state (Jibao et al., 2017).7
Authorities and providers such as these possess a range 
of capacities that capacity development programmes 
tend to overlook, and underline how ideas about what 
constitutes ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ capacity are contextually 
specific (Rhodes, 2014). At the same time, this is not to 
essentialise or romanticise informal authority, as can 
sometimes be the case (see Centre for the Future State, 
n.d.). Governments may not always act in the interests 
of society as a whole, but so too do many ‘traditional’ 
or ‘customary’ institutions exhibit their own patterns of 
exclusion and inequality. As SLRC’s research in Pakistan 
shows, this can raise a key dilemma for aid agencies 
looking to deliver support in hard-to-access communities. 
On the one hand, agencies operating in conflict-affected 
parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa felt the need to work 
through the ‘traditional’ jirga system if they were to stand 
any chance of reaching their intended beneficiaries.8 On 
the other hand, however, this fuelled perceptions within 
the community that aid had in effect been captured 
by those authorities and channelled towards favoured 
households. The question then arises: in areas of weak or 
contested formal state presence, to what extent does one 
engage with ‘alternative’ authorities when their norms and 
values might be considered unjust, discriminatory or in 
some other way problematic? 
Nonetheless, given that service delivery typically depends 
on a much broader set of governance actors than formal 
government alone, programming must similarly engage 
with that wider universe or risk being irrelevant to the 
ways in which people actually access services. While 
this is not necessarily straightforward, as the Pakistan 
research illustrates, ignoring how services are provided 
in reality makes it harder to solve the problem of delivery. 
If appropriately engaged, informal institutions can often 
be part of the solution, rather than part of the problem 
(Centre for the Future State, 2010; OECD, 2007). 
But rather than working with the ‘alternative capacities’ 
that these actors bring to the table, we often see 
capacity support being used to set up new organisational 
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structures, grafted onto existing institutional landscapes 
in the hope they might ‘fill in the gaps’. Using examples 
from SLRC’s research, these can take different forms, 
including:
 ■ Material. In Lira, northern Uganda, the regeneration of 
the town’s central marketplace was framed as key to 
not only better livelihoods for traders but also stronger 
state capacity to order and regulate vending activity 
(Mallett et al., 2016b). 
 ■ Bureaucratic. Establishing a Nutrition Directorate in 
Freetown was considered one of the most effective 
ways to kickstart action against malnutrition in Sierra 
Leone (Denney et al., 2014a; 2014b). 
 ■ Community-based. The creation of community-
development councils in Afghanistan (Pain, 2016), of 
local peacebuilding committees in Nepal (Tandukar 
et al., 2016), and of mother-to-mother support groups 
to prevent malnutrition in Sierra Leone (Denney et 
al., 2014a; 2014b) are all examples of new local 
organisations set up through capacity support.
Where ‘non-state’, ‘informal’ or customary actors are 
supported by the development community, this is often 
either considered an interim measure on the path to 
eventual state dominance or done for purely instrumental 
reasons. In South Sudan, for example, the international 
community has focused heavily on strengthening central 
government organisations’ administrative capacities, 
turning only to non-government actors when the return of 
violence necessitated it (Maxwell et al., 2015). Similarly, 
traditional healers were eventually engaged in Ebola 
response efforts in Sierra Leone once the importance of 
their role in the community was recognised (Denney et al., 
2015a). Such engagement, however, has not continued. 
The neglect of existing capacities and alternative sources 
of authority and service provision reflects how capacity 
development, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected 
situations, is based on judgements about what those 
contexts lack, rather than what they possess. This 
approach is deficit-driven, intent on identifying missing 
organisational and institutional forms rather than 
searching for what local capacity does exist and may be 
worked with. This type of ‘blank-slate’ thinking, critiqued 
by Cramer (2006) a decade ago, in many cases continues 
to inform the post-conflict strategies of external actors, as 
SLRC research in both Afghanistan (Jackson, 2016) and 
South Sudan (Maxwell and Santschi, 2014) highlights. 
Because capacity development tends to be narrowly 
framed as formal state capacity, atypical forms of capacity 
that may not be immediately recognisable to external 
actors go undetected and overlooked. 
A focus on the state tends to be at national and 
community levels, resulting in a ‘missing middle’
Just as choices are made about which dimensions of the 
governance landscape to engage with, so too can there be 
uneven treatment of different levels of government itself. 
SLRC research suggests that while we often find a relatively 
strong focus at both the national and community levels, 
there is less evidence of significant capacity support in-
between – at the district or provincial level (see Box 6).
Box 6: SLRC	research	finds	a	‘missing	middle’	
phenomenon in support for formal governance
Health provision in Sierra Leone (Denney et al.,	2014;	
2015)
Capacity development in the health sector has tended 
to target national structures (supporting the Nutrition 
Directorate, facilitating the development of national 
policy and strategy, coordinating development partners), 
as well as local ones (providing peripheral health 
units and their staff with knowledge and equipment, 
establishing new community-based organisations with 
a health remit). Meanwhile, the district level – where 
implementation within health systems actually happens 
(see also Bertone and Witter, 2015; Samuels et al. 2014) 
– has been largely overlooked.
Engaging at the provincial level in Afghanistan 
(Jackson,	2015;	2016;	Pain,	2016)
Provincial political settlements shape public goods 
provision at the community level, with the capacity 
of village-level elites to provide services far more 
dependent upon their relationships with the provincial 
centre than on the presence of new community-
development councils. But where international actors 
have engaged at the district level, they have tended 
to ‘focus on districts in isolation from their broader 
contexts, neglecting to consider how district issues may 
fall within the local or regional axes of power’ (Jackson, 
2015: 27). This reluctance has been underpinned by 
the presence of highly personalised tribal networks at 
the provincial level, which ultimately determine how 
power is exercised and services delivered. Rather than 
attempt to manage this dynamic, it has simply been 
pushed to one side.
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Decisions about which levels to engage with are 
influenced by a range of factors. But as SLRC research 
in South Sudan highlights, they are usually political 
to some degree, with choices tending to reflect the 
priorities of local elites who have significant power in 
deciding where resources should be allocated, rather 
than where capacity development is most needed 
(Maxwell et al., 2016a). In South Sudan, this has meant 
that capacity development has focused on Juba and 
state capitals, producing sizeable centre-periphery 
discrepancies (Maxwell et al., 2014; 2016a; 2016c). 
Cases such as this, as well as Afghanistan (see 
example in Box 6), raise some big questions for state-
building (and service delivery) policy, particularly in 
relation to external actors’ ability to navigate, negotiate 
and manage local power brokers. This, arguably, 
partly explains why agencies continue to fall back on 
the narrow range of largely technocratic, apolitical 
interventions outlined previously.
4.4 Engaging	with	‘systemic	capacity’	remains	
an ongoing challenge
Key messages
 ■ By focusing on individuals and organisations 
(‘the units’), capacity development is typically 
approached as a modular exercise, assuming 
micro-capacities naturally aggregate up to build 
better systems. This results in systems themselves 
receiving far less attention. 
 ■ Addressing this requires acknowledging and 
engaging the two main types of systemic capacity: 
‘hardware’ (formal regulations, mechanisms, 
procedures) and ‘software’ (power relations, 
informal institutions, social interactions).
We have seen how capacity support tends to be narrowly 
focused, with investments often targeting the familiar 
terrain of training and resource provision. This is usually 
to the detriment of factors like power and politics which, 
while somewhat more difficult to engage with, in many 
cases constitute the core of the problem. 
Underlying this practice is a tendency to concentrate 
conceptually on discrete ‘units’ of wider systems. What 
do we mean by this? Some of the most widely used 
frameworks for understanding capacity development 
break down the ‘targets’ of intervention by scale, of 
which there are typically three (Baser and Morgan, 2008; 
Pritchett et al., 2012): 
 ■ Individual. This might refer to a health worker, a 
bureaucrat in central government, or even a citizen 
whose actions one might wish to steer. 
 ■ Organisation. Such as a health clinic, government 
department, or a newly introduced council or 
committee at the local level. 
 ■ System. Understood as i) the collection of all 
previously mentioned individuals and organisations, 
as well as ii) the various channels and interactions 
that connect them – both ‘hard’ (such as procurement 
systems) and ‘soft’ (such as relationships governed by 
power dynamics and social norms).
With its focus on individuals and organisations, capacity 
development is approached as a modular exercise
The above disaggregation is useful given the slippery 
nature of the concept of capacity, helping to try and 
visualise the different levels at which it is located. But 
while lessons contained within the literature suggest 
that all three levels need to be targeted in order to 
achieve sustainable change, SLRC’s evidence suggests 
that capacity development typically operates at the 
first two levels. Figure 1 depicts these dominant ‘focal 
points’ of capacity development. 
This modus operandi is driven by: i) the fact that 
‘units’ offer tangible and relatively accessible entry 
points into the enterprise of capacity development 
(and indeed state-building more generally); ii) the 
quantifiable nature of interventions at these levels; and 
iii) the uncertainty of what it means to actually work 
systemically. In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, 
the humanitarian mindset of much programming acts as 
an additional driver, preventing a focus on longer-term 
‘whole-systems’ strengthening. As found in SLRC’s DRC 
research, for example, of the 150 or so international 
non-governmental organisations (INGOs) engaged 
in health-sector support in South Kivu in 2014, just 
four could be described as trying to build sector-wide 
capacity (Bwimana, forthcoming).
Underpinning this ‘modular’ approach is what we might 
think of as the assumption of automatic aggregation. 
This asserts that if one is able to develop capacity 
at the individual and organisational levels – by hiring 
more people, investing in better training, building 
more offices, better equipping them, and so on – then 
it is possible to develop a better capacitated system 
from below. At the other end of the spectrum there is 
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some belief in trickle-down effects; that strengthening 
capacities at the central-state level will cascade down to 
better service delivery at the local level. This thinking is 
rarely explicit but underlies much capacity development 
practice. 
The problem is, there is very little evidence to suggest 
that this modular approach to capacity development 
holds true. As de Savigny and Adam (2009: 31) put it, 
just because you are focusing and working on the ‘units’, 
does not necessarily mean you are building a system:
The building blocks alone do not constitute a 
system, any more than a pile of bricks constitutes a 
functioning building. It is the multiple relationships 
and interactions among the blocks – how one affects 
and influences the others, and is in turn affected by 
them – that convert these blocks into a system.
Ultimately, while the modular approach is a useful 
disaggregation device for thinking about the levels 
at which capacities might exist, it is less effective at 
addressing the links and connections between units, 
which we know play a key role in how services get 
delivered. 
Systemic capacity is made up of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
dimensions
We can think of the connections between the units of 
the system as the glue that holds things together, and 
can classify them in two ways: systemic hardware and 
systemic software. 
Systemic hardware refers to a range of formal 
interventions – policies, reforms, procedures, 
mechanisms, regulations – that are designed to order and 
coordinate the activities of individuals and organisations. 
These ‘sub-systems’ constitute what some call the 
functional-rational dimension of systemic capacity 
(Petersen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2013). 
So, for example, in the context of a health system, things 
like procurement mechanisms and supply chains are 
put in place to ensure the availability of medicine stocks 
in facilities across the country. There might also be 
attendance-monitoring systems and payroll reforms 
to make sure staff are both legitimate employees, are 
turning up and are getting paid. We would typically think 
of an absence of such mechanisms as a symptom of poor 
systemic capacity (to deliver services). 
Figure 1: Focal points of capacity development
Resources
Targets Levels
Individual
Organisation
System
Skills and knowledge
Capacity 
support is 
targeting …
… at the
following 
levels …
Management
Politics and power
Incentives
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Where systemic capacity development does occur, it 
tends to take place at this hardware level. This is certainly 
evident in the experience of post-war health-system 
strengthening in Sierra Leone, with capacity support 
at the systems level focusing on these technical sub-
systems. As Denney et al. (2015a: 12) note:
Development partners have focused on building 
up certain ‘sub-systems’ (or ‘building blocks’), 
particularly those of a technical nature closely linked 
to the [Free Health Care Initiative] … This approach 
is consistent with conventional modes of thinking 
about capacity building in the context of health 
systems strengthening in low-income countries, 
where the focus is typically on ‘human resources 
for health’ and ‘human resource management’, 
developing ‘hard’ management expertise, and 
generally making health staff work more effectively 
and efficiently.
Systemic software is about the less visible aspects of 
systemic capacity. It refers to a series of factors bound up 
within social and political relations: social norms, shared 
beliefs and expectations, the politics of distribution, de 
facto authority. These are arguably some of the most 
pivotal determinants of capacity, partly because they 
underlie all else, embedded as they are in the historical 
context of particular places. 
Although difficult to make out initially, these factors 
invisibly govern individual and group behaviour. They can 
both constrain and enable what people do, depending 
on their identity and relative power. To illustrate this, 
we return to the example of the district nutritionist in 
Sierra Leone, who feels unable to secure resources 
for programming or push malnutrition up the District 
Health Management Team’s agenda. The main reason 
for this is her lack of bargaining power relative to others, 
a problem reinforced by her gender. Thus, while many of 
the ‘right’ hard, formal structures are in place – a Health 
Management Team, a clear organisational framework 
within that, regular planning and coordination meetings 
– she nonetheless finds her capacity to deliver nutrition 
programming constrained by the fact that she is a woman 
trying to negotiate a deeply gendered issue in a space 
dominated by men. 
Because of the durability of norms and institutions such 
as these, the introduction of new forms of hard systemic 
capacity often does very little to displace or alter their 
dynamics. This accounts for why so much capacity 
development falls short of its so-called ‘emancipatory 
promise’ (Clarke and Oswald, 2010), and takes us back 
to the discussion about power and politics, where new 
organisational forms ultimately operate in line with pre-
existing rules of the game.
Thus, capacity is not helpfully thought of as an objective 
quality that is either possessed or not, but is rather better 
understood as a relational concept. It is both the formal 
interconnections between different parts of the system 
(such as procurement processes) as well as its less 
tangible dimensions (related to position, relative power 
and socio-cultural dynamics) which really matter – it 
is their combination which ultimately determines both 
individual and organisational action. 
The point for capacity development efforts is that there 
are parameters to current practice, and, beyond these, 
further aspects of capacity that should not be ignored. At 
the very least, it should be acknowledged that capacity 
development at the individual and organisational levels 
is shaped (and often constrained) by system-level 
dynamics. In other words, the system is not simply the 
‘sum of all things’, but an arrangement of governing 
forces itself. Acknowledging this could help to make 
interventions more realistic. It would also help us 
take seriously the idea that improving service delivery 
outcomes is not just about technically focused trainings 
and awareness-raising; it should also involve finding ways 
to shift the ‘rules of the game’ that set the overarching 
framework for how services are delivered and used.
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Many of the findings presented in section 4 have been 
documented by a range of previous evaluations and 
reports (for a selection see Berg, 1993; Denney and 
Valters, 2015; Fukuda-Parr and Malik, 2002; Kuhl, 2009; 
Land et al., 2015). Yet, as SLRC’s research findings 
illustrate, these critiques have largely failed to percolate 
into actual practices of capacity development. This raises 
the question of why these limitations persist when they 
are already known. 
In this section, we show that the ways in which we continue 
to think about and practice capacity development are 
shaped by the wider political economy of aid. They are not 
the result of unthinking people within aid organisations: 
the reams of literature from aid organisations that discuss 
the challenges and failures of capacity development attest 
to this. And yet somehow capacity development – and its 
various problematic characteristics set out in this paper – 
remains remarkably resilient. Why? We argue this is due to a 
number of features of the aid environment that are stacked 
against change.
5.1 Good	ideas	often	do	not	filter	into	practice
A number of important advances in the thinking behind 
capacity support exist and yet do not appear to filter into 
practice. A good example is the five-year study by the 
European Centre for Development Policy Management 
(ECDPM) on Capacity, Change and Performance (Baser 
and Morgan, 2008) which concluded with an empirically 
informed and practically useful framework for engaging in 
capacity development. This framework breaks down the 
broad concept of capacity into a series of five much more 
specific ‘capabilities’, each of which has been identified as 
a critical factor for performance (see Morgan, 2006). The 
‘5Cs’ model, as they refer to it, includes capabilities to:
 ■ self-organise and act (operate as a cohesive whole in 
accordance with a specified plan or vision)
 ■ generate development results (perform against and 
fulfil expected core functions)
 ■ establish supportive relationships (create meaningful 
and useful links with other stakeholders, including 
non-government actors and society more generally)
 ■ adapt and self-renew (deal with stress, shocks and 
crises as they develop)
 ■ achieve coherence (develop shared plans and 
coordinate action in multi-actor settings).
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Yet, this kind of thinking was rarely apparent in the 
capacity development practice studied by SLRC. 
The problem thus seems less with the quality of 
ideas that exist – there are useful tools and ideas 
such as the 5Cs model out there – but more with the 
disconnect between these ideas and practice. There 
are few incentives in place within the aid industry for 
practitioners to connect with the latest research, with 
time and access constituting two particular challenges. 
Equally, researchers in many cases do little to make 
their findings easily accessible to practitioners beyond 
donor capitals. Ultimately, improving the practice of 
capacity development will require the aid industry to 
facilitate an open channel of communication between 
these two communities. 
5.2 Staff are hired for technical skills rather 
than	contextual	or	conceptual	knowledge	
Aid agencies, like all bureaucracies, struggle to develop 
and retain the kind of granular knowledge that is 
necessary to effectively support capacity in specific 
times and contexts. They are often expected to combine 
sound technical knowledge with nuanced contextual 
understanding, as well as remain up to date on the 
latest conceptual thinking. While all of these forms of 
knowledge need not reside in every member of staff, this 
is still a big ask. 
What is more, a number of features of the political 
economy of aid limit aid agencies’ ability to cultivate and 
retain all these forms of knowledge, as well as to ensure 
that ideas translate into practice. Generally speaking, 
aid staff are hired for their technical skills, rather than 
their contextual knowledge. Overwhelmingly, jobs are 
advertised for health, education or water and sanitation 
advisors; not for country specialists or more conceptual 
thinkers. These technical staff are tasked with carrying 
out capacity development as one of multiple project 
components. Most often, their terms of reference specify 
tasks and goals with tangible outputs, which means that 
soft skills and in-depth country knowledge are not the 
primary focus of their role. Neither is their ability to train 
others, or to understand latest learning methodologies.
As a result, many staff who are required to ‘develop 
capacity’ or conduct trainings are not particularly well-
equipped to do so. They lack the tools to teach these 
skills to others, especially across cultural, educational 
and language barriers. And because of a lack of 
familiarity with the context in which they are working, 
they may also struggle to make sense of the cultural 
dynamics that are central to understanding existing 
capacities and ‘what counts’ as capacity in different 
contexts (Rhodes, 2014). Of course, some staff can 
and do develop these skills. But generally speaking, 
recruitment in the aid industry is not formulated to 
prioritise them. 
Further to this, because capacity development is 
often one component of wider programming, it can 
easily slip down the list of priorities when other output-
oriented tasks are pressing (Baser, n.d.). This is not 
because those working in development do not believe 
that capacity development is important. Rather, its 
time-consuming nature, combined with the fact that 
development practitioners are rarely trained in how to 
meaningfully develop capacities, means it is a daunting 
task that can easily become deprioritised.  
5.3 Short timeframes to support long-term 
change processes
In many cases, capacity development programmes 
attempt to achieve what we know are long-term 
processes of change within short timeframes. Changing 
behaviour requires ongoing reinforcement of messages 
and new practices through a range of strategies; one 
need only think of the long-term and ongoing efforts 
to reduce smoking in many developed countries, for 
instance. 
Similarly, we know that training adults in new information 
and skills takes time and repetition, with ongoing 
supervision and on-the-job mentoring required. Yet the 
funding modalities used in the aid industry rarely allow 
for this. These short timeframes are connected to donor 
countries’ political cycles, making it difficult to secure 
the long-term financial commitments necessary to 
genuinely support change in levels of capacity.
5.4 A	focus	on	the	tangible	and	quantifiable
From its earliest articulation in President Truman’s Point 
IV plan, aid outcomes have been biased towards what 
is measurable – from growth in gross domestic product 
to quantifiable results-based indicators. The belief in 
the infallibility of numbers continues to run deep in 
development, even though the shortcomings of such 
an approach to results are widely known (Jerven, 2013; 
Natsios, 2010). 
Since the World Bank introduced the use of logframes 
under McNamara’s presidency, these quantifiable 
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indicators have been used to measure highly linear 
processes of inputs, outputs and outcomes. Logframes 
are often dismissed as just a programming tool that 
can be used in better or worse ways, which – although 
undoubtedly true – overlooks the ways that logframes 
and their categories can shape the way that we 
think about and practise capacity development. In 
this sense, logframes shift from being a model for 
thinking about programmes to fundamentally shaping 
what programmes look like. Indeed, aid agency staff 
often recognise that the things they measure in their 
logframes are not transformational, but rather meet 
bureaucratic requirements. Staff are thus incentivised 
to count workshops, participants trained or supplies 
provided. 
One could argue that these are merely the things 
one has to do to tick the boxes and create space for 
more innovative ways of working. But the point is that 
the aid industry incentivises a continued reliance 
on approaches that we know are not particularly 
transformational. It is a problem that tools so 
fundamental to programming are an obstacle to, rather 
than an enabler of, transformational practice.  
Efforts have been made to overcome the constraints 
of these management tools – for instance, focussing 
on theories of change and, more recently, flexible and 
adaptive programming approaches that try to move 
away from the rigidity of pre-planned projects (Wild et al., 
2015). But theories of change are often treated as an 
add-on to logframes, and are themselves often difficult 
to change. Moreover, adaptive development, while a 
welcome shift in approaches to programming, remains 
an outlier, with the bulk of aid programming remaining 
conventional.
5.5 The push for results and a diminishing 
appetite for risk
The aid industry has come under increased pressure to 
deliver quantifiable outcomes with the emergence of the 
‘results agenda’. As the political climate has, in many 
parts of the world, become increasingly antagonistic 
towards aid spending – in part due to economic 
downturns in donor countries – demands for delivering 
impact have grown. This has led, for instance, to calls for 
performance-based financing and payment by results, 
so that donors can hold implementers to account. 
In some cases, such as in Australia, these dynamics 
have led to significant reductions in the aid budget. In 
others, such as the UK, they have led to a reduction in 
the administrative costs that support aid delivery and 
a greater reliance on outsourced programmes through 
increasingly high-value contracts. Such an environment 
further encourages the use of simple results metrics 
that respond to donor demands and political pressures, 
rather than to what might be most transformative in 
particular partner countries. 
Given the greater scrutiny of aid spending that is 
occurring in donor countries, donors’ tolerance for risk 
has also declined. This can be seen, for example, in 
the move away from budget support in many counties, 
where donors direct funding through the budget of 
partner countries to strengthen their financial systems. 
A lower appetite for risk also means relying on more 
conventional programming approaches, which do little 
to push forward changes in ways of working.  
5.6 Accountability for aid is to donor publics, 
not	beneficiaries	
All of these features raise a further concern about aid’s 
supply-driven nature, as lines of accountability typically 
flow more directly to donor-country tax payers than to 
aid beneficiaries. This can lead to training programmes 
being based on donor-led assessments of ‘gaps’ and 
consideration of what donors have available to fill them, 
leading to trainings that focus on donor, not partner 
country, priorities. As Land et al. (2015: 5) note:
Priorities determined at the national level were 
often ignored or overruled by decisions taken 
in various donor capitals, each promoting their 
own projects with their own accounting and 
reporting requirements. As a result, ownership 
and development efforts were fragmented, 
undermining the development of strong local 
institutions.
The supply-driven nature of capacity development can 
also be more subtle or unintentional. We often think of 
our own delivery mechanisms and ways of doing things 
as neutral and natural. It makes sense to export such 
models to places where we see things not working as 
well. But in doing so, we fail to recognise how our own 
approaches are embedded in particular histories and 
contexts. This is most apparent in fragile and conflict-
affected contexts where multiple donors work in the 
same sectors with the same overarching goals, yet 
are often weakly coordinated and adopt surprisingly 
different ways of doing things. 
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For instance, in Timor-Leste, a range of donors have 
been involved in supporting community policing 
programmes, but these have all differed depending on 
how such programming is undertaken in the respective 
donor countries. As a result, the variety of approaches 
brought in by the Portuguese, Brazilian, Australian and 
New Zealand agencies have varied, and have resulted 
in a confusing range of practices and pressures for the 
Timor-Leste police (Wassel, 2014). This highlights how, 
whilst ways of doing things in donor countries might 
seem neutral, value-free and applicable elsewhere, this 
is often not the case. In practice, there is rarely a single 
approach that works at all times and in all places.
This supply-driven approach can end up promoting a 
very normative vision of what states or service delivery 
arrangements ought to look like – a vision developed 
primarily by external actors. Furthermore, there is a real 
danger that this is only likely to intensify over time, with 
increasing pressure in many donor countries to draw 
more extensively on ‘cross-government’ personnel as 
part of a ‘whole-of-government’ approach, whereby 
people are deployed not just from aid agencies but 
justice, home office, defence and other departments. 
Such an approach reinforces the idea that all will be well 
if only recipient countries are able to benefit from the 
expertise of donor country x. 
A legitimate question that arises, therefore, is: what 
about local ownership? This is intended to ensure that 
the beneficiaries of aid are themselves in charge of the 
developmental processes unfolding in their countries, 
and to ensure that interventions meet their needs. Since 
the Paris Declaration, aid spending is, at least in theory, 
meant to have become more locally owned and led. Yet 
aid effectiveness principles, like local ownership, have 
been criticised for being ‘tick-box’ in nature (Wild et al., 
2015). Rather than constituting a genuine conversation 
about locally understood needs and priorities, 
ownership is reduced to partner governments signing 
up to development plans in which they have been 
consulted to varying degrees. This partly stems from 
donor concerns about risk, and a sense that partner 
governments are not able or willing to act in the interests 
of their populations. But it also stems from the supply-
driven nature of much aid, as well as a prioritisation of 
donor accountability to political leaders and publics at 
home, rather than accountability to those whom aid is 
intended to support.
5.7 Projectising social change
All of these features of the political economy of aid 
speak to a much bigger point: the ways in which the 
development industry – through capacity development 
– has ‘projectised’ what are essentially processes 
of social change. Capacity development nobly aims 
to end the need for aid by strengthening local skills, 
knowledge and capabilities to achieve a wide range 
of governance and service delivery functions without 
external assistance. And yet, the political economy of the 
aid industry has turned this endeavour into an elaborate 
social engineering process. Through this, the political 
nature of social change is stripped out and replaced with 
technocratic efforts to design, input, monitor, measure 
and deliver. With the best of intentions, this flies in the 
face of what we know about how social and political 
change happens. 
Moreover, by making social change a technocratic 
endeavour, it is made to appear value-neutral and 
apolitical. As Kenny and Clarke (2010: 7) note, tasks are 
performed as technical inputs of a wider programme: 
[C]apacity building programmes are based on a lineal 
logic directed at predetermined objectives and goals. 
Capacity building is also technocratic in so far as 
its activities become technical tasks or procedures 
and political decisions are dressed up as technical 
decisions.
As we have tried to capture throughout this paper (and 
particularly in this section), the political economy of aid 
shapes the way that capacity development is conceived 
of and practised. This means that, as a concept and a 
practice, capacity development is informed by particular 
ideas and choices about: what counts as capacity; how 
this can sensibly be measured; what functions capacity 
should enable people, organisations or systems to 
perform; the role of government alongside (and in relation 
to) other actors; and, perhaps most fundamentally, how 
change happens. The political nature of these ideas and 
choices is then obscured by the fact they get built into 
projects and subsequently broken down into technocratic 
components. Without confronting the elements of the aid 
industry’s political economy that sustain poor capacity 
development, it is difficult to see how social and political 
change can be better supported.  
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By now, the future of capacity development might seem 
rather bleak. The analysis presented in this report 
highlights some fundamental flaws in the dominant 
models of capacity development, which have not only 
been known for some time, but are actively sustained by 
the political economy of the aid industry. This concluding 
section sets out recommendations for how we might 
overcome the impasse and move capacity development 
on to focus much more centrally on how best to support 
what are ultimately processes of social and political 
change. 
State capacity – or more specifically, the question of how 
to support its development in ways that are contextually 
relevant and effective – remains one of the most 
pressing issues facing the aid community. It is also safe 
to assume that capacity development will likely continue 
to receive a sizeable share of aid budgets in the future, 
not just in places affected by fragility and conflict, but 
further afield too. Familiarity is a hard thing to shake off. 
So, if we accept that capacity development will maintain 
its centrality in mainstream development and state-
building policy in the coming years, the question then 
becomes: in what way should it evolve, and what can be 
done to support this process? 
Here, we take our cue from the ‘thinking and working 
politically’ (TWP) and related agendas9, which attempt to 
integrate an understanding of politics into development 
practice, building on rich scholarship that demonstrates 
how development practice itself is always political 
(Booth and Cammack, 2013; Carothers and de Gramont, 
2013; Ferguson, 1990; Leftwich, 2000; Mosse, 2004; 
Unsworth 2010). Such approaches can be usefully 
brought to bear on capacity development efforts, making 
them more attuned to their fundamentally political 
nature, more aware of and relevant to context, and thus 
more effective at delivering for people.
For too long capacity development has been cloaked 
in value-neutrality, hiding the fact that both its focus 
on the formal state, as well as the way in which it has 
9 The TWP agenda is one element of a wider shift towards practical 
engagement with the politics of development (see https://
twpcommunity.org). Related concepts and movements include: ‘doing 
development differently’ (DDD), which calls for improving the impact 
of development programmes by focusing on locally defined problems, 
working with local actors and embedding learning and iteration in 
programming (see DDD Manifesto at www.doingdevelopmentdifferently.
com); problem-driven iterative adaptation (PDIA), similarly focused 
on locally identified problems and using iteration and adaptation to 
experiment to find solutions to development problems (Andrews, 2013). 
Others also use the phrase ‘adaptive development’, emphasising the 
learning component (Wild et al., 2015).  
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sought to strengthen it, are themselves deeply political 
prerogatives. First, the state’s pre-eminence and its role 
as a benevolent, universal good is far from uncontested, 
particularly in contexts where hybrid authority structures 
vie for power (whether this be warlords in Afghanistan, 
elites in South Sudan, or customary leaders in Sierra 
Leone). The extent to which the formal state is or should 
be the primary authority or service provider remains 
an open question in many contexts, despite the aid 
community’s tendency to embrace it as the natural 
order of things. This is likely to become an increasingly 
pertinent question as the focus of aid shifts to middle-
income countries. In those cases where authoritarian 
governments are present, capacity development tools 
concerned with building state capacity in a traditional 
sense may be less relevant. 
Second, even if the centrality of the state is accepted, 
the ways in which it is engaged remain similarly political 
– albeit in often unacknowledged ways. To date, the 
dominant focus of aid organisations has been on 
improving bureaucratic competence, on which weak or 
strong state capacity is seen to hinge (vom Hau, 2012). 
This treats state capacity as a profoundly apolitical 
outcome, delinking processes of state-building from the 
concrete contexts in which they are actually occurring. 
It also understands an effective state as one that has 
legal-rational bureaucratic procedures in place, rather 
than one forged out of its relationship with its citizens. 
Thus, we argue that capacity development needs to be 
re-politicised in order for quality services to be delivered 
to citizens, acknowledging and reflecting on the political 
implications of its goals. We say ‘re’-politicised, because 
it has of course always been fundamentally political, even 
if this has not been explicit. By recognising that what have 
frequently been diagnosed as capacity deficits are in 
fact the result of particular constellations of power and 
incentives, it is clear that what we are really interested in 
is social and institutional change. The ways in which we 
currently think about and practise capacity development, 
then, seem partial, outdated and patronising, and ‘re-
politicisation’ probably requires doing away with some of 
the existing capacity development terminology.
We conclude by setting out five recommendations 
for what a re-politicisation of capacity development 
might look like. Rooted in the lessons and constraints 
documented in previous pages, our aim is to suggest 
how the concept – and practice – of capacity 
development might be made more operationally ‘fit for 
purpose’. 
1 Be prepared to change ways of thinking and working 
in order to ‘do’ capacity development better
It is important to keep sight of the need to change ways 
of thinking and working in the aid industry over the long 
term. This can seem an overwhelming task for single 
organisations or individuals, but something that senior 
managers and political masters in aid organisations 
should take seriously in order for capacity development, 
and aid more broadly, to improve.  
Donors must avoid incentivising implementers to default 
to tangible, technical forms of assistance that, while at 
times important, tend to be overused. Donor agencies 
need to be able to make the case better to their political 
leaders as to why less quantifiable results from aid are 
still important. While some donor staff claim to have 
already indicated space for this, more needs to be done 
to signal to implementers that they will not be penalised 
for having less easily enumerable results. By the same 
token, implementers must invest time in understanding 
the problems that lie behind capacity gaps, so that 
programmes can be developed that address the real 
blockages, and not the symptoms. 
Implementers must be incentivised to include intangible 
and soft skills. Donors and NGOs must value strong 
local knowledge, not merely as an add-on to technical 
knowledge. This means more local staff. It means not 
rotating staff so quickly that knowledge evaporates as 
soon as it is learnt. And it means viewing time invested in 
building relationships and deepening political knowledge 
as worthwhile, even though there may be no immediate 
output. Timeframes for supporting social and institutional 
change processes need to be longer, with political 
commitments to multiple phases of programming. 
Accountability needs to shift to beneficiaries, rather than 
to domestic tax payers alone, in order for aid to serve the 
interests of those it is meant to help. 
While these are big industry-wide changes, there are also 
ways that staff can begin to make important changes 
at the individual level. In particular, there is a need to 
reflect	much	more	critically	on	the	dominant	thinking	
that	filters	throughout	aid	practice. From defaulting to an 
assumption that knowledge is the missing ingredient and 
jumping to trainings or technical assistance to provide it; 
to treating improvements in public financial management 
systems as an apolitical endeavour that simply makes 
a bureaucracy function more efficiently; to an implicit 
belief that (either) more or less state is naturally better 
for all times and places. Particularly in fragile and conflict-
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affected contexts, the international community should 
be supporting local populations to figure out what power 
structures can best serve them for a range of public 
goods and services. There is no natural answer to such 
pressing questions, and the sooner the aid community 
can displace its sense of bringing simple solutions and 
invest in learning alongside local partners, the sooner we 
might achieve more effective development outcomes.
2 Accept that capacity development is about politics, 
and think and work politically to negotiate this
As this report has argued, what are usually treated 
as capacity gaps or deficits are often the result of 
constellations of political interests and incentives that get 
in the way of improved service delivery. Whether it be that 
women trained in infant and young-child feeding practices 
are unable to translate their knowledge into practice 
because of limited power in their household, or that 
Village Development Councils in Afghanistan are captured 
by pre-existing power dynamics, capacity development is 
ultimately about politics. 
There is some concern that if we accept poor service 
delivery as a problem of politics rather than capacity, then 
donors will see little role for themselves in solving these 
problems, potentially leading to aid cuts or withdrawal. 
While this represents a genuine concern that must 
be confronted, continuing	to	mask	the	real,	‘wicked’	
problem	of	politics	with	a	simpler	one	of	capacity	is	
ultimately unhelpful. Recognising the fundamental 
role of politics in impeding or enabling service delivery 
should open up a wider range of tools and levers that aid 
organisations and their partners can draw on to affect 
change. This goes beyond training programmes, technical 
assistance or provision of resources, and has best been 
described as needing to ‘think and work politically’.
While it can be difficult to see how political change is 
possible in the face of countervailing interests and 
incentives, it is important to remember that change 
happens all the time. Women and ethnic minorities get 
the vote, gay marriage becomes legal, slavery ends – and 
so on. The point is, development interventions need to 
get better at being part of these processes of political 
change, rather than treating ‘more capacity’ as the 
straightforward answer. 
In practice, this means investing in understanding the 
political constraints surrounding a problem, not merely 
by undertaking macro-level political economy analysis 
at the national level – as is so often the case – but 
by building a nuanced understanding of the micro-
level politics. This might be at the level of a particular 
bureaucracy (say, an education ministry), a problem 
(for instance, high levels of teenage pregnancy), or a 
community facing particular service delivery challenges. 
This will be an ongoing process throughout the lifespan 
of programming. This knowledge must then also filter 
through so that programmes act or work politically. That 
might entail supporting coalitions for change, brokering 
relationships between key actors, finding alignments in 
interests between key influencers and the improvements 
sought, etc. – and will involve behind-the-scenes work 
that donors will not always be able to take credit for 
publicly (Booth, 2013). 
3 Start from an understanding of how people use 
services in practice, and recognise existing capacities
The transplantation of new structures and organisations 
onto existing institutional landscapes is rooted in 
particular normative ideas about how governance and 
service delivery ought to function. There is often an 
assumption that, where certain kinds of formal structures 
are missing, capacity is non-existent and that what 
needs to follow is a ‘gap-filling’ exercise. The problem 
with this approach is that it tends to overlook alternative 
capacities, as well as the way in which citizens access 
services on a day-to-day basis. Existing social and 
political orders are often remarkably resilient, and cannot 
simply be overturned by new ideas or programmes. The 
aid community still has some way to go in acknowledging 
and learning from existing capacities, recognising that 
there is never ‘nothing there’. There	are	always	systems	
and	practices	that	‘work’	–	and	understanding	their	
logic,	who	they	benefit,	and	who	they	exclude,	is	critical. 
By doing so, we can begin to move beyond the one-way 
direction of travel implicit in much capacity development, 
towards a recognition of mutual learning and exchange. 
This is key to making capacity development more relevant 
to people’s experiences.
Knowing what capacity exists – including beyond 
what is offered by the formal state – requires a solid 
understanding of local systems. This involves spending 
time	mapping	out	who	the	key	actors	are,	what	the	
relationships	between	them	look	like,	and	how	the	
incentives and interests facing them result in particular 
behaviour. This might involve asking, for example: who are 
the providers? How do they work together (or not)? Which 
ones do citizens actually use? And what accounts for their 
preferences? Such questions will likely reveal a trove of 
information about customary behaviour, social pressures 
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and expectations, relationships with authorities (of 
various kinds), material poverty, and so on.
In line with the latest research on statehood that sees 
public authority as comprising much more than formal 
state structures, analysis must remain open to the 
potential	relevance	of	alternative	actors,	which	often	
form	part	of	the	state	in	their	own	right. Governance 
arrangements do not always work in the ways that we 
might ideally envision, but still work nonetheless (albeit 
often in the interests of some more than others). Failing to 
recognise these ‘actually existing’ dynamics both within 
and beyond the formal state shuts down possibilities for 
change, and makes capacity development efforts less 
relevant to people’s lives. 
Systems and their governance evolve over time. Such 
mapping exercises should therefore be done on an 
iterative basis. Keeping on top of this by investing in 
better	local	knowledge	and	expertise	–	and,	importantly,	
ensuring that this gets taken up by programme staff on 
the	ground	–	will	result	in	more	contextually	relevant	
capacity development. Mapping exercises also require 
sufficient focus at the granular level to account for 
the ways in which governance and service delivery 
arrangements can vary even within single provinces 
and districts. This means the common approach of 
implementing standardised interventions within a country 
is problematic. Subnational variation tends to not get 
picked up by macro-level or even sectoral-level analyses; 
thus, tailoring needs to take place on a much more 
localised basis. 
4 Think about capacity not just as tangible building 
blocks, but as the glue that holds them together
Capacity development tends to focus on the individual 
and organisational levels, overlooking what is known as 
the systemic level. This includes the connections between 
the ‘units’ of the system, as well as the wider politics, 
power and incentives that shape a service delivery 
system. This tendency implicitly assumes that systemic 
capacity can be built from below – that capacity in the 
lower levels automatically aggregates up. Yet, in practice, 
this assumption does not often hold. As a first step, there 
needs to be a ‘de-unitisation’ of the way we treat capacity. 
To build capacity at the systemic level, policy-makers 
and programmers need to look more at the channels, 
regulations and interactions that connect the various 
units	within	a	system	(which can be defined in either a 
very local or very macro sense). In other words, to work 
systemically we must think less in terms of the building 
blocks per se, and more in terms of the glue that holds 
them all together.
As this paper shows, systemic capacity comprises both 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ dimensions. The former refers to formal 
policies and procedures that regulate and structure action 
within the system (procurement mechanisms, data-
reporting systems, laws governing minimum standards 
of delivery, human-resourcing policies), while the latter 
refers to the way in which action is governed by a series 
of informal forces, including politics, power dynamics and 
social norms. It is harder to alter the latter of these, but 
given their determining influence on service delivery, it is 
essential that capacity development programmes think 
through	how	such	systemic	‘software’	might	shape	(or	
derail)	potential	reforms. 
Of course, there is no easy answer as to how one works 
on these soft systemic capacities, which perhaps 
goes some way to explain why this is often not done in 
practice. What can be helpful is to move away from the 
strictures of capacity development thinking, focusing 
not on what a given programme can do, but on what 
would need to change for services to be more effectively 
delivered. Once	an	understanding	of	the	influence	of	
politics,	power	and	social	norms	is	built,	programmes	
can	turn	to	the	question	of	what	levers	might	exist	for	
change. This may include some ‘quick wins’, centred 
on finding alignments in interests between powerful 
influencers (maybe a government minister, or a local 
community leader) and improved services. But it is 
also likely to include longer-term change processes 
to shift social norms, be this gendered inequalities, 
patronage or cultural beliefs. These can be difficult for 
aid programmes to support because they are unlikely 
to deliver transformational results in the lifetime of one 
project. But they are essential in achieving improved 
service delivery, and thus must be balanced against 
more short-term wins. While no one project is likely to be 
able to claim complete success, if these soft dimensions 
are never worked on then they will continue to prevent 
transformational change.  
5 Build the capacity of the aid industry to develop 
capacity
Finally, where capacity development activities are found 
to be useful – either in helping to overcome poor service 
delivery or to build space for other kinds of interventions 
– it is crucial (and relatively straightforward) to ensure 
that those providing capacity development know how 
to do it. Many in the aid industry are guilty of running 
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trainings, providing technical assistance, mentoring and 
so on, without knowing how to impart learning (aside 
from what they have learnt on the job). If organisations 
are in the business of capacity development, then 
they must ensure that the individuals they deploy to 
‘develop capacity’ understand appropriate teaching 
methodologies suited to those they are supporting. This 
includes considerations of literacy, culture and language, 
teaching tools, the learning environment, reinforcement 
of messages, and recourse to follow-up support. While 
this might not address the wider problem of diagnosing 
whether capacity is in fact the binding constraint, it would 
nonetheless go some way towards improving the quality 
of capacity development that gets provided.
This report sees a role for capacity development in 
future. But it is a role that is much more honest and 
explicit about its fundamentally political nature. Such a 
repositioning would enable it to more effectively grapple 
with the local political dynamics that so frequently 
prevent capacity development from achieving its 
intended goals, rather than brushing them under the 
carpet. SLRC research finds that capacity development 
efforts need to:
 ■ avoid simplistic, short-term and easily quantifiable 
forms of assistance,
 ■ recognise the centrality of politics, 
 ■ start with an understanding of how people actually 
access services, and
 ■ be more systems-focused.
Attempts to achieve this will inevitably rub up against 
features of the political economy of the aid industry. But 
this political economy is of our own making. While it can 
seem monolithic, it can be changed – but only when the 
industry consciously decides to make this happen. Given 
capacity development’s centrality to aid endeavours and 
the importance of investments that deliver change, we 
cannot afford to continue bemoaning these constraints 
without doing something to change them. 
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